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UNACCEPTABLE COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
THE DANGER OF PROBATION
CONDITIONS RESTRICTING THE
RIGHT TO HAVE CHILDREN
A. FELECIA Eppst
I. INTRODUCTION
You have the right to have as many children as you desire. You
can have seven like the Waltons, six like the Brady Bunch, or none at
all like Oprah. It is all left to your discretion-unless you fail to pay
child support, and as a result end up facing criminal charges. The
United States Constitution protects the right to freedom in procrea-
tion decisions. Generally, this means that the government cannot in-
terfere with such decisions unless it has a compelling reason to do so.
Even then, such interference must be narrowly tailored to meet gov-
ernment interests.!
In two recent cases, State v. Oakley2 and State v. Talty,3 courts
have found limits on freedom in procreation decisions constitutional
when such limits were used as probation conditions for defendants
t Assistant Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock. This article was made possible by a grant from the University
of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. Special thanks to Profes-
sor Theresa M. Beiner of the William H. Bowen Law School for her assistance in com-
pleting this project. Special thanks also to John Williams and Nicole Pugh for research
assistance.
1. See infra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
2. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
3. No. 02CA0087-M, 2003 Ohio LEXIS 2907 (Ohio App. June 18,2003), reo'd, 103
Ohio St. 3d 177 (2004). The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Talty's appeal adds little
to consideration of the issue discussed in this article and therefore is not addressed.
Talty raised two issues in his appeal: (1) that the condition did not comply with Ohio
law regarding probation conditions as stated in State v . Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990)
and (2) that the condition was an unconstitutional infringement on his right to procre-
ate. The court decided the case based on Ohio case law, thereby avoiding the State and
Federal constitutional issues raised by the condition. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d at 179.
According to the court, the three-part test it established in Jones included a require-
ment that a condition not be overbroad. [d. at 180. The anti-procreation condition at
issue was overbroad because there was no provision for it to be modified ifTalty became
current on his child support. [d. at 181. The court was careful to say that inclusion of a
means to modify the condition would not mean that the condition would be valid under
Jones. [d. at 182. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text. In addition to con-
cluding that the condition complied with Jones and the State and Federal Constitutions,
the dissent points out that all the trial court need do is include a mechanism in its order
to allow the condition to be modified. Should that happen, Talty will appeal again and
the court will be forced to deal with the merits of his constitutional challenge. Talty,
103 Ohio St. 3d at 187. The dissent has a valid point. It appears likely that the trial
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who, as a result offailure to support their children, had been convicted
of a criminal offense.s In each case, the court rejected the argument
that strict scrutiny, which would require a compelling state interest
and a narrowly tailored means used to further that interest, should be
applied to the condition. Instead, each court reviewed the condition
with a lesser degree of scrutiny and came to the conclusion that the
condition was valid." Similar restrictions placed on defendants con-
victed of severe child abuse, although subjected to the same lower
level of scrutiny, have typically been determined to be too broad and
as a result unconstitutional.f
This article explores the use of probation conditions that restrict
the right to freedom in procreation decisions. It begins by exploring
the origin and history of the right to freedom in procreation decisions.
Next, probation conditions in general will be discussed as a prelude to
reviewing cases in which the courts have upheld or imposed conditions
restricting the right to have children and those in which courts have
determined that such conditions are impermissible. Although the
cases this article reviews come from different jurisdictions, the under-
lying rationale for allowing or not allowing the probation condition to
be imposed is the same.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the constitu-
tionality of probation conditions restricting the right to have children;
however, its decision in Zablocki v. Redhail" may provide precedent.
In Zablocki, the Court concluded that exercise of another fundamental
right, the right to marry, could not be conditioned on fulfillment of a
court ordered child support obligation. In this article, the Zablocki
decision will be compared to the decisions in Oakley and Talty. This
comparison will demonstrate that there are significant differences be-
tween Zablocki and those cases. Consequently, Zablocki alone may
not prohibit courts from imposing such probation conditions.
Allowing courts to impose probation conditions that restrict the
right to have children sends several messages to poor people. It tells
them that they should not have children and that they are somehow
unfit parents. Further, it says to their children that it would have
court will simply modify, rather than remove, the condition leaving the constitutional
issue raised by Talty and discussed in this article to be resolved in a subsequent case.
4. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Wis. 2001); State v . Talty, No.
02CA0087-M, 2003 Ohio LEXIS 2907, at *1 (Ohio App. June 18, 2003).
5. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212; Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *11.
6. People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1139 (1984); Trammell v. State, 751
N.E.2d 283, 289 (Ind. App. 2001). See infra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
7. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). In Zablocki, the Court struck down a state law that pre-
vented those with unfulfilled child support obligations from getting married. This is
analogous to preventing those who have unfulfilled support obligations from having ad-
ditional children. See infra notes 163-175 and accompanying text.
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been better had they not been born. Ensuring that children are pro-
tected is a compelling government objective. Furthering this objective
in a manner that burdens the exercise of a fundamental right can lead
down a treacherous path. The dangers inherent in any approach that
burdens the exercise of the right to have children will be illustrated by
exploring other efforts to limit the right of disfavored groups to free-
dom in procreation decisions.
This article concludes that in order to avoid these dangers, state
legislatures should act to limit a trial court's ability to impose proba-
tion conditions that restrict the probationer's right to have children.
In addition, the courts should apply strict scrutiny to any government
action, including imposition of probation conditions, that attempts to
limit the right to freedom in procreation decisions. Application of
strict scrutiny will almost certainly result in the invalidation or strict
limitation of such actions. Finally, because of the fundamental nature
of the right to freedom in procreation decisions, the dangers inherent
in restricting this right, and the negative message sent to the poor,
their children, and the world, if all other means offorcing someone to
treat their children properly fail, incarceration of the offenders is pref-
erable to use of a probation condition that seeks to limit the right to
freedom in procreation decisions.
II. ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM IN
PROCREATION DECISIONS
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitution-
ality of probation conditions restricting the right to have children.f it
has decided numerous cases dealing with freedom to make procreation
decisions. The holdings in these cases make it clear that this is a fun-
damental right protected by the constitution.
Skinner v. Ohlahomai' was the first case recognizing the existence
ofthe right to freedom in procreation decisions. In Skinner, the Court
struck down an Oklahoma statute that allowed for the involuntary
sterilization of habitual criminals. Under the statute, someone who
committed larceny could be sterilized; someone who embezzled, re-
gardless of how much was stolen, was not eligible for sterilization.
The Court applied strict scrutiny to the classification made by the
statute because of the "basic liberty" involved.I? Although Skinner is
often cited as the basis for the right to freedom in procreation deci-
8. The United States Supreme Court declined to review this issue. Oakley v.
State, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001), cert denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).
9. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See infra notes 220-29 and accompanying text for addi-
tional discussion of Skinner.
10. [d. at 541.
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sions, the Court did not specifically state that this was a constitutional
right. Rather, it decided the case on equal protection grounds, apply-
ing strict scrutiny to the classification made by the statute, thereby
acknowledging the fundamental nature of the right. In subsequent
cases, the Court found what appears to be a permanent home, as part
of the right to privacy, for the right to freedom in procreation
decisions. 11
Griswold v. Connecticutl? was the first case in which the Court
explicitly recognized a right to privacy. The petitioners in Griswold
challenged a state law that prohibited the distribution of contracep-
tives to married couples. The Court struck down the law, concluding
that there is a zone of privacy created by several fundamental guaran-
tees found in the Bill of Rights.l" It described the right to marital
privacy as prenumbral to other constitutional rights but did not find a
specific place for it in the Constitution. Later, in Eisenstadt v.
BairdP: a case challenging a state prohibition on the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals, the Court concluded that:
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."15 The prohibition in Baird
was struck down on equal protection grounds.l"
The landmark abortion case, Roe v. Wade,17 provided the opportu-
nity for the Court to clearly explain the constitutional basis for the
right to privacy. In Roe, the Court held the right to an abortion is a
personal right "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" included in the guarantee of personal privacy.If In discussing
the nature of the right to an abortion, the Court noted that the rights
to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education" are all within the Fourteenth Amend-
11. [d.
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. [d. at 485. Justice Douglas suggested several possible constitutional sources
for the right to privacy. The possible sources listed were: the First Amendment with its
right of association; the Third Amendment prohibition against quartering soldiers in
private homes; the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and
seizure; the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from forced self-incrimination; and
finally, the Ninth Amendment, which provides that other rights not specifically men-
tioned by the Constitution are still retained by the people. [d. Justice Douglas con-
cluded that the right to privacy was among "penumbral" rights of "privacy and repose."
[d. at 484-85.
14. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
15. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
16. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1971).
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ment's concept ofliberty and restriction on state action.t? Once again,
in Carey v. Population Services, InternationalP' the Court discussed
the nature of the right to privacy. It struck down a state law that
prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to those under the age of
16 and provided that only a pharmacist could distribute contracep-
tives to others.s! The Court reiterated its holding in Roe that "one
aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is a 'right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy.' "22 Included in this zone of privacy
is independence in making certain important decisions including mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rear-
ing.23 Twenty years later, when the court revisited the issues raised
in Roe, it stated, "lilt is settled now, as it was when the Court heard
arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood.P"
The right to freedom in procreation decisions is now clearly a fun-
damental right included within the right to privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.sf It would appear to be a right enjoyed by
everyone, including those on probation for failure to pay child support.
The constitutional rights of those on probation can be limited by pro-
bation conditions under certain circumstances.s" Probation conditions
limiting the exercise of freedom in procreation decisions, however,
have generally not been allowed by state or federal courts.
19. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
20. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
21. Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977).
22. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
23. [d. at 685.
24. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). In Casey the Court
reaffirmed its basic holding in Roe that a woman has a fundamental right to an abor-
tion. [d. at 846. The Court modified its holding in Roe by rejecting the trimester ap-
proach. [d. at 873. In its place the Court adopted an approach that looks at whether
the State has placed an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. [d. at 877.
25. This conclusion is also supported by the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas,
522 U.S. 1064 (2003), striking down a Texas sodomy law and citing in support of this
conclusion, cases establishing the right to privacy in personal decisions, including Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Ca-
rey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. This is a generally accepted proposition. See, e.g., Trammell v. Indiana, 751
N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. App. 2001); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 210 (Wis. 2001);
State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d
1128, 1137 (1984).
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III. PROBATION CONDITIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
The use of probation emerged during the second half of the 19th
century. It grew out of the belief that offenders should be rehabili-
tated, rather than simply locked Up.27 Probation provides a means for
a court to allow an offender to remain in or return to the community
under supervision subject to conditions imposed by the court. Being
placed on probation, rather than in jail, is viewed as an act of grace on
the part of the court or legislature rather than as a matter of right for
the offender.P" Probationary sentences are the most common type of
criminal sanctions.s" Among the questions raised by the use of proba-
tion is what conditions the court may lawfully impose on the offender.
A. FEDERAL PROBATION CONDITIONS
Guidance for federal courts in setting probation conditions is
found in federal statutes and the Federal Sentencing Guideline Man-
ual. Statutory considerations for establishing probation conditions
are the same as those for determining a sentence.P? In sentencing,
courts must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the defendant's character. The sentence must reflect the seriousness
of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment,
deter criminal conduct, protect society, and provide the defendant
with any needed training or education. The court is given discretion
to impose probation conditions consistent with these factors.P- In ad-
dition, probation conditions can involve only such deprivations of lib-
27. NORA DEMLEITNER ETAL., SENTENCING LAwAND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND
GUIDELINES 519-20 (2004).
28. In upholding the imposition of a probation condition that required the defen-
dant to pay court costs, the court explained that "[p]robation is an act of grace .... It
permits a court, in its discretion, to suspend what would be the normal penalty for viola-
tion of the criminal law in favor of conditions which, if performed, tend to promote the
rehabilitation of the criminal as well as the welfare of society." Turner v, State, 484
A.2d 641, 645 (Md. App. 1984). The Court in State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis.
2001), shared this view of probation. When looking at the issue of alternatives to a
probation condition restricting Oakley's right to have children, the court noted that
Oakley had no right to probation. The judge, by placing Oakley on probation instead of
in jail, was extending a benefit Oakley had no right to. [d. at 212. The opinion that
probation is a matter of grace rather than a right was also expressed by a Michigan
court in Simms v. State, No. 238245, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 896 *1 (Mich. App. April 8,
2003). The court rejected a challenge to a probation condition that required the offender
to quit her job as a police officer. The decision was based in part on the conclusion that
probation was a matter of grace, not a matter of right. Simms could instead have been
sentenced to incarceration. [d. at *11.
29. DEMLEITNER, supra note 27, at 519. At the end of 2001 there were four million
individuals on probation in the United States. [d.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (1988).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1988).
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erty or property as are reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of
probation.V
As a condition of probation, the court must require that the defen-
dant not engage in any federal, state, or local offense.P? It may re-
quire that the defendant support his dependants, meet other family
responsibilities, and work conscientiously at suitable employment.w
Occasionally, defendants challenge probation conditions on the basis
that the conditions unnecessarily infringe on their rights. In respond-
ing to such challenges, courts focus on two issues: does the condition
reasonably relate to the defendant's rehabilitation and to protecting
the public? If the answer to this question is yes, the condition will
normally be upheld. Among cases in which defendants have chal-
lenged conditions of probation are United States u. CrandonP: United
States u. Bortels,36 and United States u. Trainer.Y! These cases are
discussed briefly to illustrate the analysis courts have followed in
dealing with this type of challenge.
In Crandon, the defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornogra-
phy. His crime involved taking sexually explicit pictures of a fourteen
year old girl he met over the Internet. Crandon's sentence included a
three-year term of supervised release.Pf One of the conditions of his
release was that "[he] not possess, procure, purchase or otherwise ob-
tain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet,
or exchange format involving computers."39 Crandon objected to this
condition on the grounds that it infringed on his liberty interest and
was not logically related to his crime. The court upheld the imposition
of the condition. The court reasoned that because Crandon used the
Internet to meet the young girl and develop an illegal sexual relation-
ship with her, the condition served to deter him from other criminal
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (b) (1988).
33. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL
§ 5B1.3.(a)(1)(200l). This would include not violating any statute that requires support
of dependants. Most states have laws criminalizing the failure to support dependants.
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
34. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5B1.3.
«xo & (c)(5) (2001).
35. 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
36. 962 F.2d. 558 (6th Cir. 1992).
37. 265 F. Supp.2d 589 (D. Md. 2003).
38. Under the sentencing guidelines, probation is a sentence in itself. If the defen-
dant violates a condition of probation, the court may continue probation or revoke pro-
bation and impose any other sentence it could have imposed initially. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANuAL, supra note 33, at Ch. 7. Pt. A (2)(a). Supervised release occurs
after the defendant completes a term of imprisonment. It may be imposed by a court at
the time of sentencing as part of the sentence to imprisonment. Conditions of super-
vised release that may be imposed are the same as conditions of probation. Id. at Ch. 7,
Pt. A (2)(b).
39. United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).
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conduct and to protect the public. The court also concluded that the
condition was narrowly drawn to accomplish these goals.s?
The defendant in United States v. Bortelet- was involved in a
high-speed chase in an effort to help her fiance, a convicted felon,
avoid being apprehended by law enforcement officers. After pleading
guilty to assaulting, resisting, or interfering with a United States
Marshall, she was sentenced to six months in jail followed by one year
of conditional supervised release. The judge required that she stay
away from all convicted felons, especially her fiance, as a condition of
her release.P Bortels appealed the imposition of this condition.v' On
appeal, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to impose
the condition was appropriate. Bortels endangered the public by en-
gaging in the high-speed chase to help her fiance. But for her involve-
ment with him, she would not have become involved in the high-speed
chase with the U.S. Marshall. Requiring that Bortels stay away from
her fiance would both aid in her rehabilitation and protect the public
from such incidents in the future.w
In Trainer, Trainer was convicted of conspiracy to violate his vic-
tim's civil rights as the result of a cross burning incident. He was sen-
tenced to thirty-five months in jail followed by three years supervised
release.w Trainer became involved with a white supremacist group,
the World Church of the Creator, while in prison and wanted to be-
come actively involved in the group while on supervised release. He
insisted that the group was opposed to illegal acts.46 Ultimately, his
probation officer requested that the court impose a condition limiting
his involvement with the group."? Trainer objected to the condition on
the grounds that it violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of
religion and free exercise of his religious beliefs.v' The court imposed
a condition that limited Trainer to one-on-one discussions about his
religious beliefs. It concluded that the condition was related to the
ultimate goals of rehabilitation and deterrence. Trainer's crime was
motivated by racial discrimination. Consequently, it made no sense to
allow him to participate in public displays of white supremacist
beliefs.s?
40. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.
41. 962 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1992).
42. United States v . Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 559 (6th Cir, 1992).
43. Bartels, 962 F.2d at 559.
44. [d. at 560.




49. [d. at 593. Cases coming to a similar conclusion include: United States v. Rit-
ter, 118 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Prendergrast, 979 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
2005] UNACCEPTABLE COLLATERAL DAMAGE 619
In the cases discussed above, the courts focused on whether the
condition at issue served to rehabilitate the defendant and protect the
public. Imposition of the condition was upheld because each was re-
lated to the crime and to the goals of probation despite its impact on
the offender's liberty. Federal courts have one set of guidelines to fol-
low in selecting probation conditions. State systems generally have
the same two primary goals for probation conditions and give trial
courts broad discretion in selecting conditions. State courts also use
similar methods to evaluate conditions if challenged by the
probationer.
B. STATE PROBATION RESTRICTIONS
Every state has statutes dealing with probation. Many address
the types of conditions courts may impose on probationers. Normally,
there are mandatory and discretionary conditions. Consistent with
the federal system, the most common mandatory condition is that the
offender commit no other criminal offense while on probation.50 Stat-
utes that address the nature of permissible conditions follow one of
two basic approaches. Underlying the two approaches is the general
idea that probation conditions must be reasonable and related to the
goals of rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public. Trial
court judges generally have broad discretion in deciding what proba-
tion conditions to impose on offenders. Some states leave the choice of
1992); and United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (Sth Cir. 1992). The defendant in Rit-
ter was convicted of embezzling money from his employer. He objected to a condition
that required him to tell future employers about his crime on the basis that the require-
ment violated his First Amendment right to free speech and association. Ritter, 118
F.3d at 504. The court upheld the lower court's decision to impose the condition as the
condition was reasonably related to protecting future employers and rehabilitating the
defendant. [d. at 506. In Prendergast, the defendant pled guilty to wire fraud. He ob-
jected to conditions of his release that prohibited the use, possession, distribution, or
administration of alcohol or any paraphernalia unless prescribed by a physician, re-
quired that he submit to periodic alcohol and drug testing, and required that he be
subject to unannounced searches for drugs and alcohol by his probation officer. Pren-
dergast, 979 F.2d at 1292. The court concluded that these conditions were not reasona-
bly related to the crime or the purposes of sentencing. [d. at 1293. Smith involved a
condition that the defendant not father any other children while on probation for drug
distribution. Smith, 972 F.2d at 961. The court removed the condition because it was
not reasonably related to the crime or the defendant's rehabilitation. [d. at 962. See
infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text for further discussion of Smith.
50. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-303 (b) (Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1.3-204 (l) (West 2003); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-624 (l)(a) (Michie 1993); 730
ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/5-6-3 (a)(1) (Supp, 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610 (a) (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (l) (Supp, 2000); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (A)
(2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204.1 (Supp, 2000); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§ 771.3 sec. 3 (l)(a) (West Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15 A-1343(b)(1) (Supp, 2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-27-18.3 (Michie 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252 (a) (Supp,
2003); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (a)(1) (Supp, 2003).
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conditions to the judge's discretion with the guidance, either in the
statute or in case law, that the conditions be reasonable. The statutes
describe permissible conditions as "appropriate" or "reasonable" leav-
ing it for the court to decide what conditions fit the particular of-
fender's situation.P! Other state statutes give courts the discretion to
impose reasonable conditions and provide a non-exclusive list of possi-
ble conditions. The court may choose conditions from the list and im-
pose others that it determines are reasonable to rehabilitate the
offender and protect the public. This is the most prevalent ap-
proach.V In those statutes that list permissible conditions, require-
ments that the offender ''work faithfully at suitable employment,"
support his or her dependants, and seek education or training in order
to get a job, are frequently among the conditions listed.53
51. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-901 (A) (Supp, 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4332 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 (Michie Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.6
(West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-220 (b)(l) (Supp, 2003); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN.eh. 276, § 87 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135(a)(2) (West 2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 651:2 v.oo (Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991a.ll.E (2003); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws § 23A-27-13 (Michie 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Michie 2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 973.09 (1)(a) (West Supp. 2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-30Ha)(iv) (Michie
2003).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-52 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.100 (a) (Michie
2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-303 (c) (Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (j) (West
2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-204 (1) (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30
(a) (Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (1) (West Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-1 (a) (1) (Supp, 2003); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-624(2)(n) (Michie 1993); 730 ILL.
COMPo STAT. § 5/5-6-3.He) (1993); IND. CODEANN. § 35-38-2-2.3(a) (Michie Supp. 2003);
RAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610 (c) (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (1) & (2) (Michie
Supp. 2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 895(A) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.17-
A, § 1204.2-A(1) (West Supp. 2003); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 771.3.3 (2) &(4) (West
Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-35 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.021.(1) & (2)
(West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (4) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2262 (1) &
(2) (2003); NEV.REV. STAT. ANN. § 176A.400(1) (Michie 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1
(a) & (b) (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.10 (Conso!. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1343 (b)(1) (Supp, 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07.2 (Supp, 2003); OHIOREV. CODE
ANN. § 2951.02 (c) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540 (l) & (2) (2003); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9754 (e)(13)(West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303 (d)(9) (2003); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 42.12, § 11.(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
18-H8)(a)(x) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 28, § 252 (a) & (b) (Supp, 2003); and W. VA. CODE
§ 62-12-9 (a) (Supp. 2003).
53. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 15-22-52 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.100 (a)(3) (Michie
2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-303 (b) & (c) (Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (d)
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-204 (2) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
1O-1(a)(1) (Supp, 2003); LA. CODE CRIM. Paoc, art. 895(A) (2) & (5) (West 2004); 730 ILL.
COMPo STAT. § 5/5-6-3 (b) (Supp, 2004); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4610 (c) (1995); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (2) (Michie Supp. 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-35 (1972); NEB.
REV.STAT. § 29-2262 (2) (2003); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 65.10.2.(e) & (f) (Conso!. 2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-35-303 (d)(l), (2), (5) (2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 42.12,
§ l1(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-H8)(a)(iii) (2003); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, § 252 (b) (Supp, 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210 (2) (2003); W. VA. CODE § 62-
12-9 (a)(l) (Supp, 2003).
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A probation condition is normally permissible if it is reasonably
related to the offender's rehabilitation and reasonably related to pro-
tection of the public.54 Some courts use a three-factor test to deter-
mine whether such a probation condition fits this description and is
therefore valid. The test requires that the condition have a reasonable
relationship to the crime involved and be reasonably related to future
criminal conduct.s" A probation condition that impinges on the proba-
tioner's constitutional rights is valid if in addition to being reasonably
related to the offender's rehabilitation and protection of the public, it
is not overly broad.P" Occasionally, probationers challenge a proba-
tion condition on the grounds that it infringes on constitutionally pro-
tected rights. The cases below illustrate the approaches courts have
taken in determining whether a probation condition is constitutionally
permissible.
The defendants in Wiggins v. Statee? were convicted of theft and
forgery after stealing a check, forging a signature on it, and cashing it
to buy goods. The evidence showed that none of the defendants were
married, but all had children.58 They had stolen the check because
they needed money to buy food for their children. The trial court im-
posed a condition prohibiting them from having sex with anyone other
than their spouses. The defendants challenged this condition on the
grounds that it was a violation of their right to privacy. In response,
the State contended that the condition had a reasonable relationship
to their rehabilitation because each defendant became involved in the
crime to support their illegitimate children.59
On appeal, the appellate court acknowledged that the trial court's
goal in imposing the condition was to avoid additional financial stress
being placed on the defendants should they have additional children.
54. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for discussion of this approach.
55. Although there are different versions of this test, all basically seek the same
information. For example, in State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469,470 (Ohio 1990) the court
considered: (1) whether the condition was reasonably related to the defendant's rehabil-
itation, (2) whether the condition had some relationship to the crime of which the defen-
dant was convicted, and (3) whether the condition related to conduct that was criminal
or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.
The court in People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1140 (1984) used a test that
consisted of the following three factors: (1) whether the condition had a relationship to
the crime of which the defendant was convicted, (2) whether the condition related to
conduct which was not itself criminal, and (3) whether the condition required or forbade
conduct not reasonably related to future criminality. The factors both courts considered
are similar and focus on the ultimate issue: whether a probation condition is related to
the rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the public. See infra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1139.
57. 386 So.2d 46 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980).
58. Wiggins v. State, 386 So.2d 46,47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980).
59. Wiggins, 386 So.2d at 47.
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However, the problem was the condition would not necessarily accom-
plish this goal; if the defendants married they could have additional
children and a spouse to support. This would lead to the same type of
financial stress the trial court sought to avoid by imposing the condi-
tion. The court applied a "reasonable relationship" test to the condi-
tion. Under this test, the condition was invalid because it had only a
tangential relationship to the crime, related to conduct that was not
criminal, and required conduct not related to future criminality.60
Krebs v. Schartzv? involved a defendant convicted of first degree
sexual assault. As a condition of probation, the court required that he
discuss with and seek approval from his probation agent before begin-
ning any dating, intimate, or sexual relationship.ss Krebs challenged
this condition as a violation of his right to privacy, arguing that it was
unreasonable and too broad. The court found that the condition was
narrowly drawn and reasonably related to his rehabilitation and to
protection of the public despite its impingement on Krebs' right to pri-
vacy.63 Krebs could have a relationship-if he secured permission to
do so from his probation agent. Although the requirement that he
seek permission was an inconvenience, it did not deny him the right to
have a relationship. Rather, the condition forced Krebs to be honest
about his problem, which is important to rehabilitation. The require-
ment also served to protect the public because the probation agent
would tell Krebs' potential partners about his deviant behavior, which
would allow them to protect their children.v"
60. [d. at 48.
61. 568 N.W. 2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
62. Krebs v, Schartz, 568 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
63. Krebs, 568 N.W.2d at 28-29.
64. [d. Other courts considering probation conditions have used similar ap-
proaches. In State v. Carrizales, 528 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), the defendant
pled no contest to a sexual assault charge. As a condition of his probation, the judge
required that he participate in a counseling program. Carrizales was involuntarily
dropped from the program because he refused to accept responsibility for the assault, a
step viewed as essential to successful completion of the program. [d. at 30. The Depart-
ment of Corrections sought to have Carrizales' probation revoked because of his failure
to complete the counseling program. Carrizales challenged the condition, arguing that
it was an unconstitutional infringement on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
[d. On appeal, the court approved the use ofthe condition. The court held that a under
Wisconsin law the trial court has broad discretion to impose "any conditions which ap-
pear to be reasonable and appropriate." [d. at 31. Further such conditions must serve
to rehabilitate the defendant and protect the public. They may impinge on the defen-
dant's constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably
related to his rehabilitation. [d.
The defendant in State v. Neurer, No. 49747-2-1, 2003 LEXIS 78 *1 (Wash. App.
Jan. 21, 2003) was convicted of domestic violence and challenged a probation condition
that prohibited him from contacting his wife, whom he had assaulted. He argued that
the condition violated his First Amendment right to freedom of association. The court
concluded that the condition was not too broad and was reasonably necessary to accom-
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Probation conditions are subject to review using the approaches
discussed above. Courts seek to ensure that probation conditions are
reasonably related to the offense, to the offender's rehabilitation and
to public protection. If a condition impinges on a fundamental right, it
may not be overly broad. Probation conditions that seek to limit the
right to have children are-at a minimum-subject to scrutiny using
one of these approaches.
IV. PROBATION RESTRICTIONS ON PROCREATION
A. OFFENSES NOT INVOLVING CHILDREN
The courts have generally not allowed probation conditions re-
stricting freedom in procreation decisions to be imposed in cases in
which children are not the object of the probationer's offense. In these
cases, although it would be good for a criminal to be reformed before
plish the essential needs of public order and to rehabilitate the defendant. Conse-
quently, the court upheld the imposition of the condition. [d. at *10.
The defendant in Simms v. State, No. 238245, 2003 LEXIS 896 *1 (Mich. App. April
8, 2003), a Detroit police officer, physically abused the victim and while holding a fire-
arm, threatened to "blow the victim's brains out." After she was convicted of reckless
use of a firearm and domestic violence, the court required that she immediately quit her
job as a condition of probation. Simms challenged this condition as unconstitutional,
unlawful, and an abuse of the court's discretion. In rejecting her challenge, the appel-
late court noted that in addition to the required terms of probation, the court may "im-
pose other lawful conditions of probation as the circumstances of the case require or
warrant or as in its judgment are proper." [d. at *9. Therefore the only way a defen-
dant could prove that the court had abused its discretion was to show that a condition is
unlawful or unwarranted in light of the circumstances presented. As a police officer,
Simms was required to carry a firearm whenever she left her home. Her reckless use of
a firearm was inconsistent with her duties as a police officer. [d. The court relied on an
earlier decision, People v. Miller, 452 N.W.2d 890 (Mich. App. 1990), in which the court
held that while there is no ultimate catalog oflegal or illegal conditions, there must be a
rational relationship between the restriction and rehabilitation. The trial court had not
abused its discretion under the facts presented because the condition would remove
Simms from a situation in which she would have to handle a firearm. The court also
concluded that there was no constitutional violation because probation is a matter of
grace and not a matter of right. [d. at *10-11.
In State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536 (Or. 1978), after the defendant pleaded guilty to
forgery, her lawyer argued that her husband was to blame for her crime. The trial court
accepted that argument and placed Martin on probation for five years on the condition
that she stay away from anyone convicted of a crime, including her husband. [d. at 538.
Martin appealed the condition. The Oregon Supreme Court modified the condition to
exclude Martin's husband. The court found under the applicable state statute the pur-
pose of probation included both rehabilitation of the defendant and freedom for the de-
fendant as long as the public was protected. Consequently, a probation condition not
related to the offense or promotion of public safety is not legally permissible. [d. at 539.
It held that in deciding what conditions to impose, the trial court must look at alterna-
tives that are less invasive to the offender's rights but still serve to rehabilitate her and
protect the society. In this case, the trial court had not even considered alternatives.
[d. at 540.
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having additional children, such restrictions do not relate to the crime
committed or to rehabilitation.
United States v. Smith6 5 provides an example of such a case.
Smith pled guilty to attempting to possess heroin. A probation report
showed that Smith had three children and two on the way-all by dif-
ferent women. The trial judge expressed concern about the welfare of
Smith's children on the record, stating: "I mean, unless [these chil-
dren] are adequately supported and sustained, we can't expect them to
start out like the Rockefeller children. And if [they] wind up in crime,
we shouldn't be too shocked that we didn't give them a good start."66
The judge sentenced Smith to fifty-one months in prison followed by
three years supervised release. During the three year period, he was
not to father any children with anyone other than his wife unless he
could show that he was supporting all of his children. He was also
ordered to pay child support. Smith challenged the condition on the
basis that it was beyond the authority of the district court."?
On appeal, the court held that the condition was not legally per-
missible. To determine the condition's validity, the court considered
whether it fostered Smith's rehabilitation and protected the public.v"
The procreation condition did not meet either criteria. The number of
children Smith fathered had nothing to do with his rehabilitation or
protecting society from the type of crime he committed. In addition,
the condition dealt with a "sensitive and important area of human
rights."69 The court cited disturbing statistics regarding the level of
poverty among black children and seemed to appreciate the district
court's concern for the welfare of Smith's children. However, the court
held the district court had no authority to impose a restriction on the
number of children Smith could father. 70
A similar conclusion was reached by a California state court in
People v. Dominguez.U Dominguez, a twenty-year-old woman who
had never been married, was the mother of two children. At the time
of her sentencing for second-degree robbery, Dominguez was not mar-
ried, and pregnant with her third child.72 As a condition of her proba-
tion, the judge required that Dominguez not become pregnant unless
she were married.I" The judge was clearly irritated with Dominguez
for being an unwed mother of three children and dependent on the
65. 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992).
66. United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (Sth Cir. 1992).
67. Smith, 972 F.2d at 961.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 962.
70. Id.
71. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623 (1967).
72. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625 (1967).
73. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. at 625.
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state for financial help. While explaining the probation condition to
her, he stated, "[y]ou are not to become pregnant until after you be-
come married . . . . You are going to prison unless you are married
first. You already have too many of those."?" He continued by asking
whether she knew the location of the Planned Parenthood Clinic and
suggesting that she be more considerate of others in society who were
supporting her children.?"
Dominguez complied with all of the conditions of her probation-
except the one regarding becoming pregnant while unmarried.I" At
the hearing concerning probation revocation, the judge once again ap-
peared irritated. This time he said: "[i]t appears to me this woman is
irresponsible, she is foisting obligations upon others .... It appears to
me that probation is not serving any useful purpose."?" Ultimately,
the judge decided to revoke Dominguez's probation because she vio-
lated the pregnancy condition.
Dominguez appealed the revocation of her probation and chal-
lenged the validity of the condition. The appellate court concluded
that although the trial court had broad discretion in setting probation
conditions, any such condition must serve the statutory ends ofproba-
tion: making amends to society and reforming and rehabilitating the
offender. Consequently, any condition that had no reasonable rela-
tionship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, related to
conduct that was not criminal and required or forbade conduct that
was not reasonably related to future criminality, was invalid.?" The
court determined the pregnancy condition met all three criteria and




77. [d. at 626.
78. Id . .at 627.
79. [d. Cases coming to a similar conclusion include: State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d
667 (Ohio App. 1996); People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App. 4th 362 (1992); and State v. Norman,
484 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1986).
The defendant in Richard pled no contest to disorderly conduct and possession of
drug paraphernalia. The sentence imposed included two years probation. As a condi-
tion of probation the court ordered the defendant to use some sort of birth control proce-
dure, be it birth control pills or tubal ligation. Richard, 680 N.E.2d at 669. On appeal,
this condition was determined to be invalid. Using the three question approach the
court concluded that the condition had no relationship to the crime, related to conduct
which is not itself criminal, and required conduct that was not reasonably related to
future criminality. [d. at 670. The Dominguez analysis was adopted by the court in
reaching a decision on the validity of a similar condition in People v. Zaring, 8 Cal. App.
4th 362 (1992). Ms. Zaring, a drug addict, was convicted offelony possession of heroin.
She was 30 years old and had five children. None of the children were in her control. As
a condition of her five year probation, she was not to become pregnant. The trial judge
emphasized that his primary reason for setting this condition was to protect any unborn
child whom he feared would be a "crack baby." [d. at 368. Ms. Zaring challenged the
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also noted that the trial court's motive for imposing the condition was
to save the public money. Although saving the taxpayers money was
in the public interest, it was not an interest sufficient to justify impo-
sition of the condition.s?
Neither of these cases involved an offense against children. The
outcome of cases involving child abuse has normally not differed from
the outcome of those cases involving crimes not related to children.
Courts have not been allowed to impose conditions restricting the
right to freedom in procreation decisions.
B. CHILD ABUSE CASES
The majority of cases in which courts have attempted to impose a
probation condition restricting procreation involved offenders con-
victed of child abuse. People v. Pointerw is one of those cases. Ruby
Pointer ("Pointer") was devoted to a macrobiotic diet. The diet did not
include fruits, milk products, meat, fish, poultry, or eggs. 82 Pointer
put her two children, Jamal (age two) and Barron (age four), on the
diet, despite the advice of their doctor and objections from Barron's
father. Ultimately, due to the effect of the diet, Jamal was hospital-
ized. Pointer brought macrobiotic food to the hospital for Jamal and
continued to breast feed him even though the doctors told her that her
milk and the food would hurt him.8 3 Upon leaving the hospital, Jamal
was removed from Pointer's custody and placed in a foster home.
Pointer kidnapped Jamal from the foster home and fled to Mexico with
him and Barron. She put Jamal back on the diet. Eventually, Pointer
condition. In resolving the issue raised by Zaring, the court turned to the holding in
Dominguez for guidance. After discussing the factors stated in Dominguez, the court
turned to the pivotal issue in its analysis. In cases in which such a condition infringes
on a fundamental right, the court must insure that the condition is not too broad. [d. at
371. Although the parties disagreed about how the three factors should be viewed in
this case, the court did not reach that issue. It determined that the condition was too
broad regardless of how the three factors were evaluated. [d. at 372. There were other
ways that the goal of the condition could be accomplished and it was clear from the
comments of the judge that Ms. Zaring would be put in jail should she become pregnant.
Consequently, she may be forced to have an abortion. [d. at 373. The court in State v.
Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 1 Cir, 1986), struck down a condition prohibiting an
out of wedlock pregnancy. In Norman, the twenty-year-old defendant was the mother of
two children born out of wedlock. After being convicted of forgery, the judge describing
this conduct as irresponsible, placed Ms. Norman on probation imposing a special condi-
tion that she "not give birth to any children outside of wedlock." On appeal, the court
struck this condition because it was not reasonably related to her rehabilitation, as re-
quired by state law. [d. at 953.
80. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 628.
81. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (1984).
82. People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1132 n.2 (1984).
83. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. at 1132-33.
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was arrested and brought back to California. Both children were per-
manently injured as a result of the diet.8 4
Pointer was found guilty of felony child endangerment and placed
on probation for five years. One condition of her probation was that
she not conceive a child while on probation.s" In coming to its decision
to impose the condition, the trial court considered testimony from a
psychiatrist indicating that Pointer would treat her present children
and any subsequent children the same way if given an opportunity. In
addition, she would not take birth control pills because of her fear of
chemicals. Pointer challenged the probation condition as a violation of
her freedom in procreation decisions.sf
In analyzing the condition, the court noted that a trial court has
broad discretion to condition probation. As the objectives of probation
conditions are to foster rehabilitation and protect the public, any pro-
bation condition must be reasonably related to these goals.s? A trial
court may impose conditions that qualify or impinge upon constitu-
tional rights when circumstances so require.8 8 In assessing the rea-
sonableness of the condition, the court considered the three factors
discussed by the court in People v. Dominguez.8 9 The Pointer court
determined that the condition related to the crime Pointer had com-
mitted. Her crime was child endangerment and the condition related
to children. The condition related to conduct that was not in itself
criminal; the act of having a child. Finally, the condition forbade con-
duct that was reasonably related to future criminal acts because as a
result of her commitment to the diet, Pointer would endanger any
child she had in the future. Indeed, due to her belief in the macrobi-
otic diet, a child could be endangered by her conduct before its birth.P?
Next, the court considered whether the condition was too broad,
noting that a heightened level of scrutiny requires that the condition
be narrowly drawn. The court recognized if there was an alternative
to the restriction on procreation, the alternative should be used. The
court acknowledged that, to the extent such a condition is overbroad,
it is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in re-
84. [d. at 1133.
85. [d.
86. [d.
87. [d. at 1138.
88. [d. at 1137.
89. 256 Cal. App.2d 623 (1967). These factors are: (1) whether the condition has a
"relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted," (2) whether the condi-
tion relates to conduct that is not itself criminal, and (3) whether the condition "requires
or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality." [d. at 627. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d. at 1138-39.
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forming and rehabilitating the defendant.f" The court concluded that
there was an alternative to restricting Pointer's right to procreate. In-
stead of the restriction, Pointer could be required to submit to preg-
nancy testing periodically. If pregnant, she could be required to follow
an intensive prenatal/ neonatal program monitored by a physician. If
necessary for the child's safety, the child could be removed from her
custody at birth.92 The court was concerned that Pointer, fearing that
the judge would throw her in jail should she become pregnant, would
be coerced into having an abortion. As there were alternatives to the
condition, it was not the least restrictive alternative and was therefore
invalid.93
A more recent case, Trammell v. Indiana P" followed the Pointer
analysis. Trammell, a mildly retarded woman, failed to get necessary
medical care for her child. She did not take him for a two month
checkup, did not feed the child properly, and did not take the child for
initial immunizations. Despite being encouraged by her mother to
take the child to a doctor, Trammell failed to act. The child eventually
died as a result of her failure to obtain proper medical care.95 Tram-
mell was charged with child neglect and found guilty but mentally ill
due to mental retardation. The court sentenced her to eighteen years.
Eight of those years were to be served on probation. A condition of
Trammell's probation was that she not become pregnant.96
In reviewing this condition, the court stated conditions that im-
pinge on constitutional rights must be designed to protect the commu-
nity and promote rehabilitation.P? Further, the court noted it must
consider "the purpose sought to be served by probation, the extent to
which constitutional rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should be
afforded probationers, and the legitimate needs oflaw enforcement."98
Following the Pointer analysis, the court concluded that although the
condition was related to protecting the public, there were less restric-
tive means to do this. Periodic pregnancy testing, prenatal/neonatal
treatment with supervision, and removal of the child from Ms. Tram-
mel's custody were all possihilities.P" Like the Pointer court, the
Trammell court was concerned that Trammel may feel forced to have
an abortion to avoid going to jail.100 Courts in other child abuse cases
91. Id. at 1139.
92. Id. at 1140.
93. Id. at 1141.
94. 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
95. Trammell v. Indiana, 751 N.E.2d 283, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
96. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286.
97. Id. at 288
98. Id.
99. Id. at 289.
100. Id. at 290.
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have followed an analysis similar to that used in Pointer and Tram-
mell, and have reached the same conclusion.w" Probation conditions
that restrict freedom in procreation decisions have been determined to
be invalid despite legitimate concerns about the physical danger the
offender poses to other children. Monitoring the mother, removing the
child from her custody, and placing the child in another home should
danger arise again are seen as viable alternatives to limiting the of-
fender's right to have additional children.t'P This type of analysis
should lead courts to invalidate similar conditions in non-support
cases.
C. CHILD SUPPORT CASES
Despite the holdings in cases involving child abuse, which seem to
indicate that probation conditions limiting procreation will not be per-
mitted if there is a reasonable alternative, in two recent cases courts
have allowed a restriction on procreation to be placed on fathers who
had a history of failing to support their children. The scenarios
presented in these two cases could easily occur in other states because
most states have laws criminalizing the failure to support one's
children.P''
101. These cases include: State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Ran. Ct. App. 1989); State
v. Howland, 420 So.2d 918 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1979); and State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). In Mosburg,
the court removed a probation condition requiring that Ms. Mosburg not become preg-
nant during her two years of probation. Ms. Mosburg had been charged and convicted of
child endangerment for abandoning her newborn child. Mosburg; 768 P.2d at 314. Ho-
wland was convicted of negligent child abuse. He was ordered not to father children
while on probation for five years. The court removed this. Howland, 420 So.2d at 919.
The defendant in Rodriguez pled nolo contendere to a charge of aggravated child abuse
for hitting her 9 year old daughter. She was ordered not to marry, become pregnant, or
have custody of her children while on probation. The restriction on having custody of
children was permitted, the others were removed. Rodriguez, 378 So.2d at 10. Lining-
ston involved a 20 year old unmarried woman convicted of child abuse for placing an
infant on a space heater. She was ordered not to have children while on five year proba-
tion. The court held that the condition was invalid. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1336.
The only case involving child abuse in which the court allowed a probation condi-
tion restricting procreation to stand is State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Mr. Kline was convicted of first degree criminal maltreatment. While on 36 months
probation for this offense, he abused his two and a half year old daughter by breaking
her leg, throwing her in a crib, and cursing at her. [d. at 698. Prior to this, Mr. Kline
and his wife had their parental rights to the first child terminated as a result of child
abuse. [d. At the hearing to revoke his probation, the court added a condition to his
probation that he not father additional children until he completed drug counseling and
anger management treatment. [d. at 699. On appeal the court upheld this condition
because of concern for the children's safety. It also noted that it was not a total ban on
Mr. Kline's reproductive rights. The trial court retained the ability to modify the condi-
tion if and when Mr. Kline completed his treatment. [d.
102. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
103. Indeed many states, like Wisconsin and Ohio, have criminalized this type of
failure to support one's children. See, ALA. CODE § 13A-13-4 (1994); ALAsKA STAT.
630 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
The first case, State v. Oakley,104 involved a defendant who per-
sonified the expression "dead beat dad." Oakley had fathered nine
children by four different women. He was able to work and had
worked in the past, yet he refused to pay his court ordered child sup-
port. Oakley had been convicted several times of criminal nonsupport;
he had been put in jail, fined-all in an effort to get him to pay. Still,
Oakley had not paid. 10 5 Oakley pled no-contest to three counts of in-
tentionally refusing to support his children in violation of Wisconsin
law. 106 The judge rejected the State's request that Oakley be sen-
tenced to six years in prison, choosing instead to place him on proba-
tion to allow him the opportunity to work and support his children.
The trial court judge conditioned Oakley's probation on his not father-
ing other children until he could show that he was supporting the nine
he already had and could support any additional children.
On appeal, Oakley argued that this condition was an unconstitu-
tional restriction on his right to procreate.I"? He sought to have the
court apply strict scrutiny to the condition because of its effect on this
fundamental right. lOB Although Oakley agreed that the State had a
compelling interest in ensuring that his children were supported, he
asserted that the condition was not narrowly. tailored to serve that
interest because it eliminated his right to procreate. As a practical
matter, he might never be able to support his children. 109
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected Oakley's argu-
ment that strict scrutiny should be applied to the condition, it found
that the condition was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compel-
ling interest of having parents support their children and rehabilitat-
ing Oakley through probation rather than prison. no Rather than
applying strict scrutiny, the court considered whether the condition
was overly broad and whether it was reasonably related to the goal of
rehabilitating Oakley. This, according to the court, was the appropri-
ate consideration due to Oakley's status as a convicted felon on proba-
§ 11.51.120 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-511 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-25-401
(2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.04 (West 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-10-1 (1999); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 15/16 (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 530.050 (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-621 (2001).
104. 629 N.W. 2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
105. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 203-04 (Wis. 2001).
106. WIS. STAT. § 948.22 (2) (1997).
107. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 207.
108. [d.
109. [d. at 208.
110. [d. at 210. The court states that "while the condition here survives strict scru-
tiny, ... we note that probation conditions-like prison regulations-are not subject to
strict scrutiny." [d. at 208 n.23.
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tion.111 The court held the condition was reasonably related to
Oakley's rehabilitation because it prevented him from violating the
law by intentionally failing to support additional children.lP In addi-
tion, the condition was not overly broad because it did not eliminate
Oakley's right to procreate.P" He could have more children, without
court approval, once he completed his probation or met his obligation
to support his children. The only alternative the court considered was
incarceration, which it noted would eliminate Oakley's right to
procreate.U?
In reaching its conclusion, the court discussed the extent of the
problem of failure to pay child support and its serious long-term conse-
quences, which it noted include "poor health, behavioral problems, de-
linquency, and low educational attainment."115 In response to the
dissent's argument that this holding conditioned the right to have
children on the ability to support them and was contrary to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Zablocki v. Redhail,116 the court
focused on the intentional nature of Oakley's conduct and his status as
a felon on probation.P?
Justice William Bablitch filed a concurring opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Patrick Crooks and Jon Wilcox. Justice Bablitch emphasized
that the Oakley case was about a defendant who intentionally refused
to pay child support, thereby doing egregious harm to his children,
rather than someone who was unable to pay. Had the case involved a
defendant who was unable to pay, Justice Bablitch would have agreed
with the dissenting justices.118 A second concurring opinion restated
the applicable test and stressed that Oakley's children, not Oakley,
were the true victims because Oakley's refusal to pay support may
mean that his children will be raised in poverty.P?
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley-in a dissent joined in by Chief Jus-
tice Shirley Abrahamson and Justice Diane Sykes-discussed the con-
stitutional infirmities in the court's decision. Justice Bradley began
by addressing the preeminence ofthe right involved and what she saw
as the true nature of the court's decision. She noted that the Wiscon-
sin court was-at the time-the only court to have concluded that the
111. [d. at 210.
112. [d. at 213.
113. [d. at 212.
114. [d.
115. [d. at 204.
116. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
117. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208 n.23.
118. [d. at 214 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
119. [d. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring).
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right to have children could be conditioned on the ability to support
them. 120
Justice Bradley felt that due to the fundamental nature of the
right implicated by the condition, it should be subject to heightened
scrutiny. After briefly discussing the difference between a condition
being "not overly broad" rather than "narrowly drawn," she concluded
that either way the issue was framed, the key concern was whether
there were alternatives to the use of this condition.P! To Justice
Bradley, the majority framed the condition as one focused on the in-
tentional refusal to pay support, rather than a condition related to
having children. In her opinion, the latter was what the court should
have addressed in its decision.P''
Turning to the constitutional concerns raised by the condition,
she pointed out that the trial judge imposed the condition on Oakley
even though he knew Oakley would not be able to comply-by sup-
porting his children.P'' This means that even with the help of the
condition, the State would not accomplish its goal of having Oakley
support his children. In addition, there were other means available to
collect child support. Other probation conditions could be used to ac-
complish this goal. 124 Justice Bradley believed that the Court in
Zablocki v. Redhail125 addressed a similar issue and concluded that
the state could not condition exercise of a fundamental right, the right
to marry in Zablocki, on payment of child support when there were
other means available to get support for the children.P"
Next, Justice Bradley addressed the "unacceptable collateral con-
sequences" of allowing the imposition of such a condition.P? First of
all, the condition increased the possibility of a coercive abortion. The
condition would serve as an incentive for the woman involved to seek
120. "Today's decision makes this the only court in the country to declare constitu-
tional a condition that limits a probationer's right to procreate based on his financial
ability to support his children." Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 219.
122. Id. at 221.
123. Justice Bradley was quoting the trial judge who said "it would always be a
struggle to support these children and in truth [Oakley) could not reasonably be ex-
pected to fully support them." Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
124. "The narrowly drawn means described by the Supreme Court in Zablocki still
exist today and are appropriate means of advancing the state's interest in a manner
that does not impair the fundamental right to procreate." Id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). Justice Bradley did not attempt to list the various means available to collect
child support, but rather described them as "too numerous to list." Id. at 218 n.S (Brad-
ley, J., dissenting).
125. See infra notes 163-172 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Zablocki.
126. Oakley, 629 N.W. 2d at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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an abortion.P" She cited the decisions in People v. Pointerl29 and
State v. Mosburgl3 0 in support of her position. Secondly, use of the
condition rationed the right to have children based on the wealth of
the parent. Finally, the condition may very well be unworkable. It
would be difficult to monitor; in fact, if Mr. Oakley violated the condi-
tion he would go to jail and another child would go unsupported.P-
In a separate dissent joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and
Justice Bradley, Justice Sykes described the condition as a "compul-
sory, state-sponsored, court enforced financial test for future
parenthood."132 She reiterated that the Court's decision in Zablocki
answered "no" to the question of whether the ability to exercise a fun-
damental right could be conditioned on payment of child support.133
Despite the constitutional concerns raised by imposing this type
of condition, an Ohio court, without dissent, upheld the imposition of a
similar condition citing Oakley in support of its decision in State v.
Talty.134 Mr. Talty was charged with violating Ohio law by unlaw-
fully and recklessly failing to support three of his seven children. He
pled no-contest and the court placed him on probation for five years.
As a condition of probation, the court required that Talty make all
reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving another child.l35 Talty appealed
the trial court's decision to impose this condition. He argued that
strict scrutiny should be applied to the trial court's action. The appel-
128. Justice Bradley noted that "[the condition] places the woman in an untenable
position: have an abortion or be responsible for Oakley going to prison for eight years."
Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
129. 151 Cal. App.3d 1128 (1984).' See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
130. 758 P.2d 313 (Kan, Ct. App. 1989). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
131. Justice Bradley noted: "[t]he majority has essentially authorized a judicially
imposed 'credit-check' on the right to bear and beget children." Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at
220 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
134. No. 02CA0087-M, 2003 LEXIS 2907 *1 (Ohio App. June 18, 2003), reo'd, 103
Ohio St. 3d 177 (2004). In Ohio, probation conditions are referred to as community
control sanctions. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court used
cases dealing with probation conditions to evaluate the anti-procreation condition. The
Ohio Supreme Court stated that:
The community-control statute, despite changing the manner in which proba-
tion was administered, did not change its underlying goals of rehabilitation,
administering justice, and ensuring good behavior-notwithstanding the lack of
explicit language in the community-control statute to that effect. Conse-
quently, we see no meaningful distinction between community control and pro-
bation for purposes of reviewing the reasonableness of their conditions.
Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d at 179. The court's analysis focused on State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d
469 (Ohio 1990) a case involving probation conditions. For clarity, the term "probation
condition"-rather than "community control sanction", will be used in this article.
135. Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *4. The trial judge stated of the condition; "What
those efforts are are [sic] up to him, that is not for me to say, I am not mandating what
he does, only that he has to make reasonable efforts to do something." Id.
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late court rejected this argument and instead applied the three-factor
test adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Jones. 136
The court found that the condition reasonably related to Talty's
rehabilitation, had some relationship to the crime he had been con-
victed of, and related to conduct that was "criminal or was reasonably
related to future criminality."137 In reaching this conclusion, the
court distinguished two Ohio cases that also applied the three-factor
test but held such conditions impermissible. The first case, State v.
Livingston, 138 involved a defendant charged with child abuse. Accord-
ing to the Talty court, the condition in Livingston was not closely re-
lated to the child abuse offense. The number of children Livingston
had did not give rise to her offense. Talty's offense, however, was di-
rectly related to the number of children he had.139 In addition, the
court distinguished Livingston because unlike the condition in that
case, the condition in Talty was not a complete bar to Talty's right to
procreate. If Livingston got pregnant, she would have violated the
condition regardless of efforts she may have taken to avoid preg-
nancy.140 Talty would violate the condition only ifhe fathered a child
after failing to take reasonable steps to avoid fathering another
child.141 The second case, State v. Richard,142 involved a drug of-
fense. The court easily distinguished that case because the condition
in Richard was not related to the offense or to Richard's rehabilita-
tion. Citing Oakley in support of its conclusion, the Talty court found
that the condition was not overly broad, and, as a result, did not look
for alternatives.w''
136. Id. at *11. The three factor test used by the Talty court was based on a prior
Ohio case, State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio 1990). The three factors are: (1)
whether the condition was reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation, (2)
whether the condition had some relationship to the crime of which the defendant was
convicted, and (3) whether the condition related to conduct that was "criminal or rea-
sonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation." Id.
The three questions are similar to those used by the courts in Pointer and Trammell
discussed supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
137. Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *24-26.
138. 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1976). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
139. Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907 at *19.
140. Id. at *19-20.
141. Id. at *20. The court's analysis on this point is flawed. According to the court,
the condition was not a complete bar to Talty's right to procreate because if a violation
occurred the state would have to show that Talty was the father of any child conceived
and that Talty had not taken reasonable steps to avoid the pregnancy. Talty is still not
allowed to exercise his right to freedom in procreation decisions while he is on proba-
tion. That the state must prove that he is the father of the child and that he did not
take steps to avoid the pregnancy, does not allow Talty freedom to choose to become a
father. Thus, it appears that the condition is a complete bar to procreation during the
period of probation.
142. 680 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio App. 1996). See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
143. Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *24.
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1. Why the Different Results?
The courts in Oakley and Talty reached a different conclusion
than other courts that have reviewed the use of a probation condition
restricting the right to procreate. The factors the courts considered in
every case were basically the same; yet the final results were not the
same. The reason for this is a slight difference in the legal analysis
used by the Oakley and Talty courts.
In Pointer and Trammell, for example, the courts considered
whether the condition was related to the crime involved, whether it
addressed conduct that was not itself criminal, and whether the condi-
tion was related to future criminality.v'" The resolution of these is-
sues was not crucial to the ultimate decision in either case; the critical
issue was whether there were other means to accomplish the objective
of rehabilitating the offender and protecting the children besides a
condition that impinged on a fundamental right. 14 5
In Oakley, the court focused primarily on two factors: whether the
condition was reasonably related to rehabilitation and to protecting
the victim. 1 4 6 In Talty, the court used the three factor approach.v'?
The courts in Oakley and Talty rejected the idea that the condition
being evaluated was too broad.l48 Their focus was in large part on the
intentional or willful nature of the offense and the fact that the alter-
native to probation itself, incarceration, would eliminate the offender's
right to procreate with no corresponding benefit to their children.v'?
Consequently, consideration of alternative means to collect support
was not part of the court's analysis leading to the result that the con-
ditions in both cases were permissible.V" The Oakley court looked at
incarceration as the alternative to the probation condition. This
raises the question of whether courts should look at probation condi-
tions as alternatives to incarceration or look at probation conditions in
light of alternative means to rehabilitate the defendant and protect
victims. If the focus is on the former, almost any type of probation
condition would be permissible because most will be less restrictive
than incarceration.F'!
144. Pointer, 151 Cal. App.3d at 1139; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 288.
145. [d.
146. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206-07.
147. Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *24-26.
148. [d. at *24, Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212
149. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212; Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *23-26.
150. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212; Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *23.
151. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Talty's appeal, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177
(2004), addressed this issue. The court rejected the "act of grace" theory and the idea
that the government may withhold from a probationer any right that is denied to a
prisoner. [d. at 182-83. The court stated that there is a difference between legitimate
penological interests and legitimate probationary interests. The court held the "act of
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If the courts applied the same analysis in Oakley and Talty as was
used in Pointer and Trammell, the result may well have been differ-
ent. Under the three-factor approach, the first issue would be
whether the condition relates to the offense. 15 2 The answer appears
to be yes. The crime is failure to pay child support; the condition re-
lates to having children who may not be supported. The next inquiry
would be whether the condition relates to conduct which is not itself
criminal.V" Having a child, no matter how little money you have, is
not a crime. Finally, whether the condition reasonably relates to fu-
ture criminality would be considered. The answer to this question is
not clear. Obviously, one must have a child before child support be-
comes a concern. However, having a child you are not able to support
is not automatically a crime. At the point a parent willfully fails to
pay support or ignores a court order, the action becomes a crime.l5 4
Future criminality depends on the probationer fathering a child and,
despite an ability to financially support the child, refusing to pay child
support.
The Pointer approach looks at whether there are alternatives to
the condition. Consequently, the final question would be whether
there are alternatives to the imposition of a probation condition re-
stricting the offender's right to have children that will serve to reha-
bilitate the offender and protect the children.V" The criminal conduct
is not fathering a child; rather, the crime is the failure to pay child
support. Therefore, a probation condition that addressed the payment
of support, regardless of the number of children involved, would be
appropriate. This would lead a court using the Pointer approach to
look for alternative means to collect child support. Pertinent to the
discussion of alternatives under this approach would be the ability of
courts to require, as a condition of probation, that the offender get a
grace theory" was inconsistent with the Jones test and Ohio precedent. It noted that
the Jones three part test would not be necessary if a trial judge can simply deny any
right to a probationer that is denied to a prisoner. Id. See supra note 138 and accompa-
nying text. This holding would seem to indicate that at least in Ohio, trial courts should
not look at probation conditions as alternatives to incarceration, but rather as alterna-
tives to other probation conditions.
152. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1138.
153. Id.
154. The necessary mental culpability requirement depends on the wording of the
criminal statute. For instance Oakley was charged with intentionally refusing to sup-
port his children. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202. He purposely failed to pay. Talty, how-
ever, was charged with recklessly failing to support his children. Talty, 2003 LEXIS
2907, at *1. This means that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustified
risk that his children would not be supported. Because of the potential for a prison
sentence this is not likely to be a strict liability offense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (providing for mental culpability requirements for criminal offenses).
155. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1139.
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job, support his dependants, and follow all laws and court orders. 15 6
In addition, the availability of administrative means to collect support
would also be a consideration.P? As there will always be alternative
means to collect support available, the condition would not be permit-
ted under the Pointer approach.
None of the cases discussed above required that a court apply
strict scrutiny in reviewing the probation condition. The approach
taken by the courts in Pointer and Trammell leads to the same result
that application of strict scrutiny would lead to-the condition would
not be permitted. Strict scrutiny requires a compelling government
interest and a restriction narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 15 8 A
restriction that is too broad is not narrowly tailored. A restriction that
is narrowly tailored is not too broad. The Pointer and Trammell
courts determined that the restriction was too broad because there
were alternatives to accomplish the government's goals of protecting
the children and rehabilitating the offender.P" This is an approach
like strict scrutiny although the courts decline to use those words.t''?
V. ZABLOCKI V. REDHAlL: DOES ZABLOCKI PROVIDE THE
ANSWER?
The United States Supreme Court has not decided a case involv-
ing probation conditions that limit the right to have children, so there
is no final definitive word on the subject.l"" The dissenting Justices
in Oakley cited the Court's decision in Zablocki v. Redhail 16 2 in sup-
156. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
159. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. at 1140; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289.
160. Abortion was also an issue that influenced the courts in Pointer, Zaring, Mos-
burg, and Trammell. The courts were concerned that the defendants, who were female,
if faced with the possibility of incarceration, might feel coerced into having an abortion.
In Oakley, the dissenting justices voiced this concern, however the majority failed to
address the issue. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Likewise the
court in Talty did not address this issue. Although no rationale is given for this exclu-
sion, it could be a matter oflaw and biology. The father of an unborn child has no legal
control over the mother's decision to have an abortion. Under the law, the mother is the
only one who can make that decision. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
895-96 (1992). Should she decide to have the child, against the father's will, he would
still be obligated to provide support. In the event he is subject to a probation condition
restricting his freedom to have children, he could be in violation of that condition. On
the other hand, a female offender has the choice of having the child and risking going to
jail, or having an abortion to retain her freedom. The decision is hers with no one to
stand in her way. The restriction could make the choice to have an abortion more likely
and as a result make coercive abortion more of a concern when the defendant is a
woman.
161. The Court declined to review the decision in State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200
(Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).
162. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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port of their argument that the right to have children could not be
conditioned on payment of child support when there are alternative
means available to collect support.t''" However, reliance on Zablocki
when reviewing a probation condition could be misplaced. Although
the presence of alternative means to collect support was a factor in the
Court's decision in Zablocki, there is one significant difference in the
situation presented in Zablocki: Redhail had not been convicted of a
criminal offense because of his failure to support his child.
The Court's decision in Zablocki supports the position that procre-
ation should not be restricted ifthere are alternative methods to reha-
bilitate the defendant and protect the victim. In Zablocki, Redhail
challenged a Wisconsin statute requiring any state resident, who was
the non-custodial parent of a child he was obligated to support by a
court order or judgment, to get permission to marry from a state court.
Permission would not be given unless the person proved that he had
complied with the support order and that his children were not and
were not likely to become public charges. Any marriage license issued
without court permission was declared void by the statute.P'"
Redhail had fathered a child when he was a high school student.
After a paternity action in which he admitted he was the child's fa-
ther, he was ordered to pay child support. Redhail was indigent and
unemployed for several years following the paternity action-result-
ing in a substantial arrearage. Due to the arrearage and his inability
to pay, he was not eligible for a marriage license and could not
marry.165 Wisconsin sought to justify this statutory scheme on the
basis that it protected the children involved by insuring that support
would be paid and preventing the parent from assuming additional
financial responsibilities.w"
The Court struck down the Wisconsin statute as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the
law. The classification made by the statute encompassed all Wiscon-
sin residents who were non-custodial parents and who had a court or-
dered obligation to support minor children. Those included within
this classification could not marry without permission from a court.
The Court determined that strict scrutiny should be applied because a
fundamental right, the right to marry, was involved. Consequently,
the State could restrict that right only if it had a compelling interest
and the restriction was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.I"?
163. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218
164. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
165. [d. at 378.
166. [d. at 388.
167. [d.
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The Court decided that the State's interests were not sufficient to
justify the restriction on marriage for several reasons. First, although
the state argued that the restriction protected children by ensuring
that support would be paid, the restriction did not result in money
being paid to the children.l6 8 Nor did the condition prevent the par-
ent from assuming other financial responsibilities that might affect
his ability to pay support. In addition, the State had other ways to
collect child support and thereby protect the children.w? The Court
held that the classification interfered directly and substantially with
the right to marry because no one in the class had the right to marry
without court permission. Those who had no means to pay would
never be able to marry. The burden imposed by the statute forced
them to forgo that right or to suffer a serious intrusion in order to
exercise the right.l??
A probation condition restricting the right to have children is-in
essence-the same thing as the marriage restriction in Zablocki. An
individual under such court supervision cannot have more children
unless he receives permission from the court. In both situations a
court is saying to someone: "you cannot exercise a fundamental
right171 because of failure to support your children." In Zablocki,
there were alternative methods available to collect child support. This
fact was important to the Court's analysis.Fs The same methods are
available as alternatives to imposition of a probation condition re-
stricting the right to have children.V''
In Zablocki, the Court pointed out that the restriction on mar-
riage would not result in money for the children but could result in
those unable to pay never being able to marry.l74 Likewise, the pro-
bation conditions in Oakley and Talty do not result in money for their
children. Rather, they result in the father not having additional chil-
dren until he completes his probation or demonstrates he can support
them all. 175 Although the condition ends with probation, in the event
the offender fails to pay again, this cycle could be repeated. In all
three situations, the result of the restriction is not necessarily that the
168. Id. at 389.
169. Id. at 390.
170. Id. at 387.
171. The rights to marry and to have children are fundamental rights protected as
part of the right to privacy by the constitution. See supra notes 10-26 and accompany-
ing text.
172. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389.
173. The Court noted that there were several alternatives available under the civil
and criminal codes of Wisconsin. Id. at 390. The same methods to collect child support
are currently available in addition to extensive administrative procedures. See infra
notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
174. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
175. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203; Talty, 2003 LEXIS 2907, at *3.
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children already existing get the support they are due. Other steps
must be taken to obtain support for the children. The Court in
Zablocki also pointed out that nothing prevented Redhail from incur-
ring other financial obligations that could also affect his ability to pay
support.t?" Similarly, in Oakley and Talty, nothing prevented the of-
fenders from assuming other financial obligations.
It is not clear how the Zablocki decision would apply to probation-
ers like Oakley and Talty. Both pled no contest to a criminal charge
involving willful or intentional failure to pay child support. This may
mean that they had the ability to work and pay support, but simply
would not do it. They were convicted criminals in need of rehabilita-
tion. Their children were victims in need of protection. Redhail, on
the other hand, was an indigent person unable to pay child support.
His children were in need of support-just as were Oakley's and
Talty's. Absent the willful or intentional nature of the failure to sup-
port, all three situations are the same. All involve conditioning the
exercise of a fundamental right on the payment of child support.
In Zablocki, three of the concurring Justices imply that the result
would be different if the justification for the statute was collection of
support and it provided a method to exempt those who because of pov-
erty would never be able to pay.!"? Thus, only those who could pay
176. Zablocki, 434 U.S. 390.
177. The Court decided Zablocki by a vote of eight to one. Justice Marshall deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. Four Justices filed separate concurrences. Three of the
concurring Justices were troubled by the statute's failure to exempt indigent people
from its provisions. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart pointed out the statute
"makes no allowance for the truly indigent." Id. at 394. Expanding on the problem, he
stated: "[tlhe fact remains that some people simply cannot afford to meet the statute's
financial requirements. To deny these people permission to marry penalizes them for
failing to do that which they cannot do. Insofar as it applies to indigents, the state law
is an irrational means of achieving these objectives of the State." Id. Justice Powell felt
that the "collection device" rationale offered by the State posed a difficult question. Jus-
tice Powell disagreed with the suggestion in the Court's opinion that a State may never
condition the right to marry on satisfaction of an existing support obligation simply
because the State has alternative methods of compelling such payments. He concluded
however that:
[t}o the extent this restriction applies to persons who are able to make the re-
quired support payments but simply wish to shirk their moral and legal obliga-
tion, the Constitution interposes no bar to this additional collection
mechanism. The vice inheres, not in the collection concept, but in the failure to
make provision for those without the means to comply with child-support
obligations.
Id. at 400.
Justice Stevens concurring in the decision made a similar point:
[ulnder this statute, a person's economic status may determine his eligibility to
enter into a lawful marriage . . . . The statute appears to reflect a legislative
judgment that persons who have demonstrated an inability to support their
offspring should not be permitted to marry and thereafter to bring additional
children into the world. Even putting to one side the growing number of child-
less marriages and the burgeoning number of children born out of wedlock,
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but intentionally failed to pay would be prevented from getting mar-
ried. Redhail clearly fits into the category of those unable to pay.
Oakley and Talty may not fit into that category.
In Zablocki, the Court applied strict scrutiny because a funda-
mental right, the right to marry, was involved.t?" The Court's appli-
cation of strict scrutiny in Zablocki supports the position that strict
scrutiny should be applied to probation conditions that restrict the of-
fender's right to have children. The Zablocki decision is arguably
precedential authority for courts considering the constitutionality of
probation conditions limiting the right to have children. Regardless of
how courts apply Zablocki, it remains for society to determine whether
courts should have the power to impose such conditions. Although
there would be benefits in the successful imposition of a probation con-
dition restricting the right to have children, the serious potential col-
lateral damage to society should be carefully considered in deciding
whether to allow such conditions to be imposed.
VI. THE BENEFITS TO SOCIETY
Imposition of a probation condition that succeeds in preventing
the probationer from having children should result in a safe and se-
cure life for all of the probationer's children. In child abuse cases, chil-
dren who may be victims of physical abuse or neglect would not be
born. The probationer would have time to receive treatment, counsel-
ing, or other needed services without the stress of additional children.
Children the probationer already has would most likely be removed
from the probationer's custody. This would allow the probationer time
to get his or her life in order before resuming the responsibilities of
parenting. Child Protective Services ("CPS") would develop a case
plan for the parent to complete before she could regain custody of her
children. The end result, if all went well, would be a happy secure
family. Society and the children would benefit from this outcome.F?
that sort of reasoning cannot justify this deliberate discrimination against the
poor.
[d. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. [d. at 388.
179. In State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), this type of analysis lead
the Oregon Court of Appeals to allow imposition of such a condition. Mr. Kline was
convicted of first degree criminal maltreatment of one of his children. Prior to this, Mr.
Kline and his wife had their parental rights to the first child terminated as a result of
child abuse. [d. at 698. While on 36 months probation for this offense, he abused his
two and a half month old daughter by breaking her leg, throwing her in a crib, and
cursing at her. [d. At the hearing to revoke his probation, the trial court added a condi-
tion to his probation that he not father additional children until he completed drug
counseling and anger management treatment. [d. at 699. On appeal, the court upheld
this condition because of concern for the children's safety. It also noted that it was not a
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Likewise, society would benefit from the successful use of a proba-
tion condition that prevents the probationer from having children un-
til he is able to support them. As pointed out by the Oakley court, the
children are the victims. If imposition of the condition is successful,
meaning the offender has no children while on probation, there will be
no additional victims. ISO The probationer would not have to deal with
the stress caused by the need to support additional children. He
would have time while on probation to get a job and begin to meet his
current support obligations. Since the probationer would be required
to share his income with all of his children, the fewer he has, the more
income he will have available to support current children. In addition,
his relationship with his current children is likely to improve. Re-
search indicates that parents who pay support tend to be more in-
volved with their children, thereby providing emotional support in
addition to financial support. lSI
Although there are clear benefits to society and children in
preventing probationers from having children while on probation
when their offense involves mistreatment of their children, the proba-
tion condition alone is not enough to accomplish the ultimate goal of
protecting the children. Other steps must be taken to stop someone
who mistreated their child from doing it again and to secure financial
support for the children. These other steps would themselves be suffi-
cient to protect the children without the use of the probation condi-
tion. In light of the dangers use of a probation condition restricting
anyone's right to have children poses to our society, these other steps
alone should be used. 18 2
VII. DANGER TO SOCIETY
A. Is THIS THE WORLD WE WANT?
Imposition of a condition restricting a probationer's right to have
children raises concerns beyond the tangible impact that this action
may have on the individual involved. If a child is not supported to the
point that the family is impoverished, society will bear a financial cost
in the form of government programs such as TANF, Food stamps, and
total ban on Mr. Kline's reproductive rights. The trial court retained the ability to mod-
ify the condition if and when Mr. Kline completed his treatment. Id.
180. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 468.
181. Paula Roberts, Center for Law and Social Policy, The Importance ofChild Sup-
port Enforcement: What Recent Social Science Research Tells Us 4 (Spring 2002), availa-
ble at, http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1024415166.93/The_Importance_oC
Child_Support_Enforcement.pdf.
182. The other steps referred to include use of other probation conditions at the
court's disposal and use of the administrative means available to collect support. See
supra notes 243-47 accompanying text.
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Medicaid, that will assist in supporting the child.l8 3 It is better to
bear the tangible costs of supporting the child, than to suffer the in-
tangible costs of allowing a trial court judge to order someone not to
have children because of a concern that they can't afford to support
them. The intangible costs include the message such an action sends
to poor families and their children about the value of their lives-as
well as to the rest of the world about the values of our society.
The most obvious consequence to the child of allowing courts to
impose a probation condition restricting the probationer's right to
have children, regardless of the type of offense involved, is that some
children will never be born. Either by abortion or some other form of
birth control, these children will never experience life; poor or rich-
physically abused or financially secure. If the condition is permitted,
the message to poor children and their families is clear; it is better for
a child not to be born than to come into the world facing poverty. It
tells poor families that they should not have children.18 4 It sends the
183. Failure to pay child support is also a serious problem. According to statistics
available from the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement, in 2002 approximately
$6 billion in past due child support was collected. Approximately 2.5 billion was col-
lected on behalf of children who had never received public assistance, 3 billion was col-
lected on behalf of those who formerly received assistance, and $500 million on behalf of
those currently receiving assistance. Office ofChild Support Enforcement Table 63: To-
tal Amount ofSupport Distributed as Arrears, FY 2002, available at http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/annual_statistical_report/table_63.html.
Unfortunately, $92.3 billion in child support is due to almost 20 million children in the
United States. $28 billion of this is owed to children who have never received public
assistance. $58 million is owed to children who formerly received assistance, and $12
million is owed to children who are currently receiving public assistance. Office ofChild
Support Enforcement Table 63: Amount ofArrearages Due for all Fiscal Years, available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/annuaLstatistical_report/ta-
ble_62.html. See Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-support Epidemic, 2003
DET.C.L. REV. 357 (discussing the extent of the child support problem).
184. This message seems harsh but successful implementation of the family cap on
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") benefits, another encroachment
upon procreation rights, suggests that society believes these are good messages and that
money is at the root of the desire to prevent some people from having children. Like
probation conditions limiting the right to have children, the TANF cap has withstood
legal challenges. The "family cap" on cash assistance to poor families was first imple-
mented as a reform to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Act ("PRWORA"), which replaced
the AFDC program with TANF, also allows the states to adopt a "family cap" provision.
Such provisions eliminate the increase that occurred under the AFDC program when an
additional child was added to the family. Like probation restrictions on procreation,
family cap provisions have been challenged as violations of the constitutional right to
procreate. Courts have rejected the argument that strict scrutiny should be applied to
the cap, concluding that the cap does not infringe on the right to make procreation deci-
sions, but rather reflects a decision by the legislature not to fund procreation choices
made by TANF/AFDC recipients. As such, only a rational basis is needed to justify the
cap. A rational basis has been found in the goals of enhancing family structure, while
fostering responsibility and self-sufficiency. Unfortunately the result of the cap for the
children involved is that they are born into families who have fewer resources to provide
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collateral message that these parents, due to lack of financial re-
sources, are unfit for parenthood.
Suppose the court is informed that someone subject to such a con-
dition is pregnant or has fathered a child. Picture a man or woman
who has allegedly violated the condition being dragged into court be-
cause of this violation. If the alleged mother-to-be is in fact pregnant,
she or the father, whoever is subject to the condition, is thrown in jail
for having a child in violation of the court's order not to have more
children. This is an unpleasant picture at best-something we could
easily imagine happening in other countries where individual free-
doms are subject to more government regulation. We so abhor scena-
rios like this that those who flee their home country to avoid
imposition of mandatory birth control laws are deemed subject to per-
secution on account of a political opinion. 185 If they can establish facts
to support their claim, they are eligible for political asylum. The facts
for the basic needs. However, the family cap achieves the goal of saving the state and
taxpayers money.
In re C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995), affd by 92 F.3d 171 (Sd Cir.
1996), arose under the AFDC program. Prior to the cap's adoption, families receiving
AFDC would get an increase of $102 per month for the second child born into the family
and $64 per month for the third child. The family cap provision eliminated the increase
for children conceived while the family was receiving AFDC benefits. Id. at 999. The
plaintiffs sought to have strict scrutiny applied arguing that the cap was in reality a
government attempt to deny them benefits should they make procreative decisions dis-
favored by the state and thus an infringement on their freedom to make procreative
choices. The court declined to apply strict scrutiny and held that the cap need only be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1014. The latter standard of
review was appropriate because the cap did not prohibit additional children from shar-
ing in the AFDC grant already received by the family, it simply did not give more money
to the family. Although the state couldn't hinder procreation, it did not have to remove
obstacles it did not create. The legitimate government purposes the court found for the
cap were providing AFDC recipients with the same structure of incentives as working
families, promoting individual responsibility, and strengthening and stabilizing the
family unit. Id. at 1015. See also N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000); Sojourner v. New Jersey Department of Human Resources, 828 A.2d 306 (N.J.
2003) (upholding the family cap in the face of similar constitutional challenges).
The message sent to poor families dependant on TANF to help care for their chil-
dren by the "family cap" and the decisions upholding it is "do not have children." If you
choose to have a child, or have a child despite steps taken to avoid pregnancy, no TANF
assistance will be available to help provide the basic necessities of life for that child.
The child has no choice in the matter. Having a child will thus make the poor even
poorer-a result that seems to be endorsed by the courts. Once again, it is better for the
parents to seek sterilization or abortion, to insure that the child will not be conceived or
born, rather than having the child. The message to the children is "it would have been
better had you not been born." These are the same messages sent by probation condi-
tions that limit the right to have children due to failure to pay child support.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(B) (2003). This statute states: "a person who has been
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or other resistance to a
coercive population control program" is a refugee entitled to political as asylum.
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of one case in which the petitioner successfully sought asylum sound
eerily similar to the hypothetical situation posed above.
In Li v. Ashcroft,18G two young people, ages nineteen and twenty,
met and fell in love. Although old enough to marry in most countries,
under the strict population control laws of China, they were too
young.P'? The couple was open about their desire to marry. Rumors
spread that they were living together and that Li was pregnant, both
violations ofthe population control laws. 188 The local population con-
trol officer came to Li's home to investigate the rumor. After being
told to end her relationship with the young man, Li told the official
that "I'm going to have many babies ... you have nothing to do with
this."189 Later, two government nurses showed up at Li's doorstep and
took her away for a forced gynecological exam. After the forced exam
revealed Li was not pregnant, she was warned not to become pregnant
without being married and not to marry below the legal age.190 The
consequence should she violate these rules would be an involuntary
abortion and sterilization. Despite this, Li and her boyfriend an-
nounced their intent to marry. Later, they fled China when they
learned that the government had issued warrants for their arrest.
These facts were enough to support her claim for political asylum.P'!
Probation conditions restricting the right to have children can
lead to a similar result. Someone alleged to be pregnant will be forced
to undergo an exam of some kind. If pregnant, there will be some type
of consequence-most likely revocation of probation and time in jail.
They can avoid the consequence by deciding to use birth control or
more radically to be sterilized, the most certain way to avoid becoming
pregnant. They could also choose to have an abortion to avoid violat-
186. 356 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2004).
187. 312 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002), reu'd en bane, 356 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.
2004). The legal age for women to marry was twenty and for men twenty-two. [d.
188. u. 312 F.3d at 1097-98.
189. [d. 1097.
190. [d. 1097-98.
191. Li, 356 F.3d at 1160. Similarly appalling are the facts alleged in support of an
asylum petition in Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (Bth Cir. 2004). In that case, the peti-
tioner testified that he and his wife married, in a traditional Chinese ceremony in their
village, while too young under the birth control laws. [d. at 555. The marriage could
not be registered because they are still, under the law of the land, too young to marry.
The wife became pregnant and under the law this pregnancy was illegal. [d. She was
forced to have an abortion when she was in her third trimester of pregnancy. [d. at 556.
In another case, the petitioner alleged that when it was discovered that his wife was
pregnant with the couple's second child, one more than allowed by the law, she was
subjected to an involuntary abortion in her seventh month of pregnancy. Liu V. Ash-
croft, 93 Fed. App. (3d Cir. 2004).
Scenarios such as these, if established by sufficient evidence, provide adequate
grounds for granting a petition for asylum. That United States law allows this illus-
trates our commitment to freedom in procreation decisions. The use of probation condi-
tions that limit freedom to have children is inconsistent with this commitment.
646 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
ing the terms of their probation and possibly going to jail. A choice
between incarceration and sterilization or abortion really is not a vol-
untary choice. The idea that someone would have to make such a
choice is contrary to the freedom guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.w-' Allowing even a probationer to be forced to make
such a choice sends a negative message to the world about the values
of our society.
B. THE PROVERBIAL DANGEROUS SLIPPERY SLOPE
First, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a
probation condition restricting Mr. Oakley's right to have children.
Later, an Ohio court allowed imposition of a similar condition, citing
Oakley in support of its conclusion. Most states have a law criminaliz-
ing the failure to support one's dependants. 19 3 A probation condition
restricting someone's right to have children could be used in any state,
unless there is a statute preventing the court from imposing such a
condition. With the increased emphasis by the government on child
support collection, there likely will be other courts that will use a simi-
lar probation condition. Efforts to force "dead beat dads" to stop hav-
ing children may be motivated by valid concerns, but may lead down a
treacherous path. The end of this path could easily be forced steriliza-
tion of offenders, presented as a voluntary alternative to incarcera-
tion, justified as a means to protect offenders from the consequences of
192. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text. Reasonable minds differ about
the extent of this freedom. Reports surfaced in May 2004 ofthe efforts of one local judge
to deal with the problem of "dead beat" dads. Judge Michael Foellger, a family court
judge in Campbell Kentucky, considered implementing a payment plan for those who
"voluntarily" elected to have a vasectomy rather than face 30 days in jail. Judge
Foellger reported having already given some "dead beat" dads the option of 30 days in
jailor a vasectomy. Six out of seven selected the vasectomy. The payment plan would
be a new step in Judge Foellger's efforts to deal with "dead beat" dads. Judge Wants to
Arrange Payment Plans for Vasectomies, Associated Press, available at http://www.ken-
tucky.com/mld/kentucky/news.
The differing opinions on this issue were raised during an interview of Jeffrey Lev-
ing, President Emeritus of Fatherhood Educational Institute and Barbara Harris, Di-
rector of Children Requiring a Caring Community ("CRACK"). Mr. Leving opposed
Judge Foellger's plan arguing that it is contrary to basic human rights guaranteed by
the constitution. He used the Court's decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, to support his
position. Ms. Harris on the other hand, supported Judge Foellger's plan, arguing that it
protected the children. Ms. Harris would extend the plan to include drug addicted wo-
men who may have children who will suffer because of the mother's addiction. Inter-
view by Tavis Smiley with Jeffrey Leving, President Emeritus of Fatherhood
Educational Institute and Barbara Harris, Director of Children Requiring a Caring
Community ("CRACK"), NATIONAL PuBLIC RADIO, (May 27, 2004).
193. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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their actions and to protect their potential children from the danger of
not being financially supported by a parent.194
The desire to prevent certain individuals from having children is
not new. Past efforts to limit the right of certain groups to procreate
have been targeted at disfavored groups. Such efforts have included
the forced sterilization of members of the targeted group. Although
sterilization is a permanent, rather than temporary, means of restrict-
ing procreation, cases dealing with sterilization raise similar con-
cerns. It is also an option courts appear to be encouraging when they
impose probation conditions restricting the right to have children be-
cause it is a means to ensure compliance and avoid incarceration. The
decision to select this method of birth control is not truly voluntary if
made to avoid violating a court order and going to jail.
"Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands
it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to
wither and disappear."195 These words, penned by the Court when an-
alyzing a sterilization statute, likewise apply to other procreation lim-
its. The decisions in Skinner v. Oklahoma,196 striking down a statute
that required the sterilization of habitual criminals, and Buck v.
Bell,197 upholding a statute that allowed the sterilization of people
with mental disabilities, illustrate the concerns raised by limiting pro-
creative rights.
1. Background: Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma
The statutes at issue in Buck and Skinner were enacted at a time
when many people in our society accepted eugenics as a valid social
theory.19B Eugenics provides that certain traits, good and bad, are in-
heritable by descendants. Positive eugenics encouraged those with
good traits to marry and have children. Negative eugenics sought to
limit procreation by those with bad traits.199 The eugenicists believed
that society could be improved by this and might be destroyed without
194. The efforts by a Campbell County Kentucky family court judge to deal with the
problem of "dead beat" dads illustrate the reality of this concern. See supra note 193
and accompanying text.
195. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
196. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
197. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
198. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values? 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1428 (1981).
199. Id. See also MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR
PEOPLE WITHMENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 67 (1999) and Wil-
liam T. Vakowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social
Issues of Eugenics, 2 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 189-194 (1971).
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. this.2oO Their focus was on what they believed to be good for society,
rather than the rights of the individual. They therefore believed that
charity should be guided by the welfare of society, not the welfare of
individuals.sv! Eugenic plans were based on the idea that "much so-
cial inadequacy is of a deep-seated biological nature, and can be reme-
died only by cutting off the human strains that produce it."202 One
obvious way to further such ideas was sterilization of those it was be-
lieved endangered society by having children.
Legislatures enacted statutes allowing involuntary sterilization of
such individuals in twenty-eight states.203 These statutes generally
targeted those who were feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic, epilep-
tic, inebriate, diseased, blind, deaf, deformed, and dependant (or-
phans, never-do-wells, homeless, tramps and paupers).204 Many such
statutes were overturned due to constitutional problems.205 Due pro-
cess was an issue for statutes that failed to provide notice and a hear-
ing to the target.206 Equal protection problems arose when statutes
targeted some but not all of those similarly situated.s"? Finally, objec-
tions on the basis of cruel and unusual punishment were raised when
statutes sought to use sterilization solely as a punishment for a
crime.208 The statutes at issue in Buck and Skinner were drafted to
200. FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 199, at 66-67.
201. Cynkar, supra note 198, at 1426.
202. [d. at 1428.
203. PHILIPREILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OFINVOLUNTARY STERILIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 88 (1991). In 1927, two states adopted sterilization laws. In
1928, one additional state adopted a sterilization law. In 1929, three states adopted
new sterilization laws and six other states revised existing statutes to ensure they fol-
lowed the statute upheld in Buck. In 1931, sterilization bills were introduced in ten
states and became law in five, raising the number of states with enabling statutes to
twenty-eight.
204. PAUL WEINDLING, STATE EUGENIC STERILIZATION HISTORY; A BRIEF OVERVIEW
31 (Robitscher ed. 1973). The categories created by sterilization statutes were consis-
tent with the eugenic view that certain genes needed to be eliminated from American
stock. Cynkar, supra note 198, at 1428.
205. See generally, Donald Giannella, EUGENIC STERILIZATION AND THE LAW 68-78
(Robitscher ed. 1973).
206. Davis v . Berry, 216 F. 413, 419 (1914 S.D. Iowa). In Davis, the court struck
down a statute that allowed someone with two felony convictions to be sterilized with-
out notice or hearing. The court found that sterilization was cruel and unusual punish-
ment. It also held that the procedure used by the statute denied the individual due
process and that the statute was a bill of attainder. See also Williams v. Smith, 131
N.E. 2, 2-3 (Ind. 1921). In Williams, the court found that a sterilization procedure that
gave the target no opportunity to challenge the evidence presented denied due process
to individuals targeted. See supra note 206 and accompanying texy.
207. Smith v . Board of Examiner of Feeble-minded, 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913); Osborn v .
Thomason, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (1918) affd, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918). The sterilization stat-
utes in both cases applied only to those in state institutions. Both courts concluded that
it denied equal protection because those not institutionalized presented the same dan-
ger to society and yet were not eligible for sterilization under the statutes challenged.
208. Davis, 216 F. at 417. See also supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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carry out eugenic principles by preventing the "feeble-minded" in
Buck, and criminals in Skinner, from having children, because they
purportedly would have characteristics similar to their parents. The
statute in Buck was crafted with the possible constitutional objections
in mind.
2. Buck v. Bell: Three Generations of Imbeciles Is Enough2 0 9
Carrie Buck was a white woman committed to a state institution.
She and her mother were alleged to be feeble minded. Carrie had a
daughter, born out of wedlock, who was allegedly feeble minded as
well. The director of the institution initiated procedures to have Car-
rie sterilized.U? A Virginia statute provided a procedure for steril-
izing inmates of state institutions who were afflicted with a hereditary
form of insanity or imbecility. The procedure included notice, hearing,
and appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Vir-
ginia.211 The Supreme Court of the United States held that this pro-
cedure complied with due process requirements, concluding that it
was a permissible means for the state to protect the public welfare.212
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, callously stated in the Buck
decision that "[ijt is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or let them starve for their im-
becility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from con-
tinuing their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."213
The Court did not question the premise underlying the statute,
namely, that the "feeble mindedness" would be inherited.s-s
209. See generally Cynkar, supra note 198; REILLY, supra note 203, at 86; and Paul
A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 30 (1985), for additional background on Buck v. Bell.
210. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
211. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206.
212. Id. at 207.
213. Id.
214. This was due, in part, to the fact that the only evidence before the Court on this
issue was expert testimony presented in support of the statute by the Virginia Colony
for the Epileptics. Ms. Buck's lawyer, presented no expert testimony to contradict the
witness for the Colony. Cynkar, supra note 198, at 1430.
Buck v. Bell was a friendly lawsuit brought to test the constitutional validity ofthe
Virginia sterilization statute. The superintendent of the colony, Dr. Albert Priddy and
the attorney for the colony, Mr. Aubrey Strode, were instrumental in enacting the stat-
ute challenged in Buck. Lombardo, supra note 209, at 45. The attorney selected to
represent Ms. Buck was Mr. Irving Whitehead, the former director of the colony and a
friend of Mr. Strobe. Id. at 50. Mr. Whitehead did little to develop Ms. Buck's case
during the trial. Although there was evidence indicating that neither Ms. Buck nor her
child was actually feebleminded, Mr. Whitehead failed to develop these facts at the trial
court level. Ms. Buck attended school, worked, and was involved in a church in the
community. Id. at 52-53. Unfortunately, she had become pregnant as the result of a
rape. She was considered immoral and therefore feebleminded. Id. at 54. Mr. White-
head also did not attempt to contradict expert testimony that Ms. Buck and her daugh-
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Although the Court has not overruled the Buck decision, it is not
currently followed.s-" Unfortunately, it cleared the way for states to
adopt similar procedures for the involuntary sterilization of 60,000
purportedly mentally ill/disabled people between 1907-1972.2 16 Soci-
ety eventually realized the error of this approach, and sterilizations of
mentally disabled persons, although still permissible in some states,
are now more limited.s-?
3. Skinner v. Oklahoma: Attempt to Sterilize Criminals
The Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma2 18 reached a result different
from Buck even though the same eugenic rationale was used to sup-
port the statute Skinner challenged. In Skinner, the Court struck
down an Oklahoma law that allowed for the involuntary sterilization
of habitual criminals. Skinner was convicted of stealing chickens in
1926 and of robbery with a firearm in 1929. In 1935, Oklahoma en-
acted the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which required the
sterilization of those convicted two or more times of felonies involving
moral turpitude.P-" The sterilization statute did not apply to felonies
arising out of violations of prohibitory laws, the revenue acts, embez-
zlement, or political offenses. In addition, it did not apply if the indi-
vidual was convicted of three separate offenses at one trial or if the
three separate convictions occurred in another state.
The next year, the Oklahoma Attorney General started proceed-
ings to have Skinner sterilized. Under the statute, Skinner was enti-
tled to be given notice of the proceeding, an opportunity to be heard,
and a jury trial. The role of the jury was to determine whether Skin-
ner had been convicted of two or more felonies involving moral turpi-
tude and whether the sterilization could be done without danger to his
ter were feeble minded and that this condition was hereditary. [d. at 51. His argument
at the Supreme Court focused on the constitutional concerns that had proved fatal to
other sterilization statutes: due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. [d. at 57.
215. The constitutional principles stated in Buck have never been overturned. Some
scholars feel that Buck is still viable law. The majority suggest it would be overturned
if presented to the Supreme Court today. Cynkar, supra note 198, at 1430.
216. JONAS ROBITSCHER, EUGENIC STERILIZATION Appendix 2A (1973).
217. States still struggle with the proper approach to sterilization of mentally dis-
abled individuals. See generally FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 199, at 80-109 for a dis-
cussion of the concerns raised by sterilization of mentally disabled individuals. Two
basic issues are raised by involuntary sterilization. First, who should make the choice?
Secondly, what criteria should be used in deciding whether someone should be steril-
ized? [d. at 81.
218. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
219. Skinner v . Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
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life. 220 Skinner could not challenge the premise underlying the stat-
ute-that his children who would be criminals.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected Skinner's appeal of the
sterilization order, concluding that the statute was a proper exercise
of the state's police power and that the court must defer to the legisla-
ture's judgment that the statute was necessary to protect the public.
No evidence was before the court supporting the basis for the stat-
ute-nor did it appear that the legislature had any such evidence
before it when it enacted the statute.221 Skinner appealed to the
United States Supreme Court arguing, among other issues, that he
had been denied due process oflaw under the Fourteenth Amendment
because he had not been given an opportunity to challenge the basis
for the sterilization-that he would father children who would be so-
cially undesirable.222
The Court applied strict scrutiny to the classification made by the
statute because of the "basic liberty"223 involved. However, the Court
did not state the constitutional basis for its conclusion that the right
to freedom in procreation decisions was constitutionally protected.224
The Court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because of the distinction it made be-
tween those convicted of similar offenses. Someone who committed
larceny could be sterilized; those who embezzled, regardless of the
amount involved could not be sterilized.225 Oklahoma law treated em-
bezzlement and larceny the same for all purposes but application of
the sterilization law. The State made no showing that descendants of
those who committed larceny were more likely to inherit criminal
traits than descendants of those who embezzled.
220. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537.
221. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, deferring to the State Legislature, was willing
to assume that the Legislature had evidence before it from which it found as fact that
habitual criminals were more likely than not to have children who will also have crimi-
nal tendencies. The Court was also willing to assume that the Legislature concluded
that embezzlers were not likely to have children who would inherit their criminal ten-
dencies. Thus the exclusion of embezzlers from the sterilization statute was permissi-
ble. See Petitioner's Brief, at 10, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (No. 782).
222. [d. at 10. Skinner also argued that the statute violated the constitutional
prohibitions of double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. [d. at 27, 30.
223. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
224. [d. The Court stated:
Iwle are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race .... He is forever deprived of a basic liberty .... We
mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny
of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential.
[d.
225. [d. at 542.
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The holding in Skinner has often been cited in support of the con-
stitutional right to freedom in procreation decisions. 226 This is a leg-
acy quite different from that of Buck, which instead cleared the way
for involuntary sterilizations. Skinner blocked the path of those who
would seek to involuntarily sterilize convicted criminals and has pro-
vided the basis to challenge actions taken by the state to limit the
right to have children. In Oakley, it was argued-unsuccessfully-
that Skinner prevented the courts from imposing probation conditions
on the offender's right to have children.s-?
4. What do Buck, Skinner, Oakley, and Talty have in common?
Although the situations and cases discussed above arose at differ-
ent times and have different facts, there are common themes running
through all of them. Carrie Buck was a representative of a class disfa-
vored at the time-those thought to be feeble-minded. As a "feeble-
minded" person she could be involuntarily institutionalized. The ra-
tionale for allowing sterilization was that preventing Ms. Buck from
having children would in fact allow her to be safely returned to society
because it would protect her, protect any children she might otherwise
have, and protect society. As she would be unable to care for any chil-
dren, they would either become criminals or be dependant on the state
for their support.2 2 8 To avoid the time and expense such a result
would cost the public, the argument goes, it was better to sterilize Ms.
Buck.
The Oklahoma sterilization law was aimed at a specified group of
people-those who committed certain types of crimes.229 These
crimes were not rationally different from other crimes that could not
lead to sterilization. An unemployed person is likely to be poor and
not likely to have an opportunity to embezzle, violate revenue laws, or
commit a political offense. Stealing chickens or robbery are more
likely to be a poor person's crimes. This statute targeted poor
thieves-another disfavored group-in the interest of protecting
society.
The rationale for allowing probation conditions that restrict pro-
creation is similar to that used to support the decision in Buck v. Bell
a~d the Oklahoma legislature's act in Skinner. Oakley and Talty are
226. For example, the petitioner in Greber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir.
2002), used Skinner to support his argument that he should be allowed to exercise his
right to procreate using artificial means while incarcerated. Skinner has also been cited
as the basis for procreative freedom in other landmark cases. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
227. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 207-08.
228. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
229. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537.
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also members of a disfavored class-dead beat dads. In addition, they
are criminals who may rightly be incarcerated for their crimes. A pro-
bation condition that restricts procreation allows them to return to the
community instead of being incarcerated. The condition protects them
by preventing them from violating the law by not supporting other
children; it protects the children because it ensures that children will
not be born who will not be financially supported; and it protects soci-
ety from the possibility that we will have to step in and support the
children in absence of the father. 2 3 0
All of these efforts send the same messages: it is better for society
if some people-those who are mentally disabled, have criminal con-
victions, or who lack the means to provide financial support-did not
have children. The corresponding message sent to the children is that
it would have been better had they not been born.
VIII. WHY ARE PROBATION CONDITIONS THE WRONG
CHOICE?
Probation conditions that limit freedom to have children should
not be used by the courts. Most probation statutes leave some discre-
tion to judges to impose reasonable probation conditions.F'! This sim-
ply does not provide enough guidance when an important
constitutionally protected right is at issue. Instead, statutes should
provide specific guidance on acceptable probation conditions. Any
statute or regulation proposed should clearly state that a court may
not impose a condition restricting the right to procreate. Courts would
then be forced to use other alternatives to ensure that children receive
the financial support they deserve. Leaving too much room for inter-
pretation could result in a trial court interpreting the provision to al-
low some form of restriction. To avoid this possibility the statute or
regulation must be crystal clear.
That the statute must be clear is evident from the decision in Fer-
rell v. State. 23 2 The defendant in that case pleaded guilty to aggra-
vated child battery and was sentenced to three months in jail followed
by forty-eight months on probation. Her probation was subject to the
230. A similar rationale supports the TANF cap, discussed at note 183. TANF re-
cipients are members of a disfavored class-poor people dependent on government ben-
efits for their survival. Limiting the amount of the TANF grant serves a good purpose.
It protects TANF recipients by helping them to attain self-sufficiency rather than fur-
thering dependence on the government. In addition, it protects society by limiting the
amount we pay to support poor families. Unfortunately, it does not appear to protect
the children involved. They are born into a family without the financial means to sup-
port them and are not eligible, if they remain with their birth family, for cash benefits
as a result of the TANF cap.
231. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
232. 659 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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condition that "she not engage in any activity with the reasonable po-
tential of causing pregnancy."233 Illinois had adopted the following
statutory provision: "[a] court may not impose a sentence or disposi-
tion for a felony or misdemeanor that requires the defendant to be
implanted or injected with or use any form of birth control."234 Sev-
eral months after Ferrell was placed on probation, a court ordered
pregnancy test revealed that she was pregnant. The state successfully
sought to revoke her probation. The court later re-sentenced her for
the aggravated child battery to six years in prison.235
On appeal Ferrell argued that the condition violated the statute
by requiring her to abstain from sex, a form of birth control.236 The
State responded that the statute only prevented the court from requir-
ing Ferrell to use a chemical or medical form of birth control. It ar-
gued that since abstinence is not a chemical form of birth control, it
was not covered by the statute.P'? Both parties pointed to certain
parts of the legislative debates in support of their arguments.
The court agreed with Ferrell, concluding that "any form of birth
control" means just what it says. The probation condition required
that Ferrell use some form of birth control whether abstinence or
something else. Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the con-
dition violated the plain meaning of the statute.238
Despite the court's conclusion that the statute's meaning is plain,
the statute is ambiguous because it states "any form of birth control,"
yet specifically refers to chemical means of birth control by stating
"implanted or injected." If the intent of the legislature was to prevent
a trial court from setting any probation condition that restricts an of-
fender's right to make procreation decisions, it could have chosen bet-
ter language to accomplish this objective. By choosing the words that
it did, the Illinois legislature left the door open for a trial court to use
the type of probation condition the court imposed in Ferrell. The trial
court's action in imposing the condition despite the language of the
statute highlights the fact that legislatures should use crystal clear
language when dealing with such a sensitive issue. The Ferrell deci-
sion appears to foreclose the possibility that an Illinois trial court
would decide to establish a probation condition prohibiting an offender
from having children while on probation regardless of the offense.
This forces a court to use different conditions to accomplish the goals
of probation.
233. Ferrell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
234. 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3 (k) (Supp. 2004).
235. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d at 993.
236. [d. at 994.
237. [d.
238. [d. at 995.
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In absence of a clear statutory provision, courts should apply
strict scrutiny to any probation condition that restricts the right to
make procreation decisions. Clearly, the right to freedom in procrea-
tion decisions is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Normally government actions that infringe on such rights are subject
to strict scrutiny.s''? The application of strict scrutiny is supported, if
not mandated, by the holding in Zablocki v. Redhail.2 40 Use of strict
scrutiny would result in the invalidation of the condition. Courts
would be required to look for a compelling state interest and a nar-
rowly tailored restriction. Most importantly, courts would be forced to
look seriously at alternatives to the imposition of the condition. Alter-
natives are available and if used effectively will result in protection of
the children and of society as well as rehabilitation of the offender.
A. IF NOT PROBATION CONDITIONS, THEN WHAT?
There are alternatives to imposing a probation condition restrict-
ing the right to have children that will protect the children and society
from the dangers posed by a parent who fails to support his children.
First of all, courts should aggressively use the other probation condi-
tions available to them. Ai; discussed above, courts have the authority
to require that a probationer get a job and support his dependents.P'!
Employment is the key. Once the probationer has ajob, his wages can
be assigned involuntarily to the child support enforcement agency. If
the probationer refuses to work, he can be put in jail for failing to
comply with the condition requiring him to get a job. In addition, Fed-
erallaw requires that every state have an extensive child support col-
lection program that must include administrative procedures to:
(1) automatically withhold child support payments from
wages,242
(2) intercept tax refunds,243
(3) place liens on real estate,244
(4) and withhold, suspend, or restrict the use of drivers' li-
censes, professional and occupational licenses, recrea-
tional licenses and sporting licenses of those owing
support.245
Once the probationer has a job, there is a mechanism in place to
collect child support. The use of other probation conditions that re-
239. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
240. The Court decided that use of strict scrutiny was appropriate because of the
fundamental nature of the right involved. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
241. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(l)(A) (2000).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (a)(3)(A) (2000).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (a)(4).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (a)(16).
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quire that the offender get a job and support his dependants coupled
with the use of the system already in place to collect child support
provide a reasonable alternative to restricting a probationer's right to
have children.P-"
Use of intermittent sentencing is also an alternative. This option
was raised by the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing
proposed by the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Committee. One of
the proposed standards permits the offender to be committed to a fa-
cility on an intermittent basis. 2 4 7 This would allow the court to permit
246. Although domestic relations is normally considered an area under the cogni-
zance of the states, the issue of child support is extensively regulated indirectly by the
federal government. An example of Congress' intervention in this area is the Child Sup-
port Enforcement Program 42 U.S.C. § 651-669 ("CSP") created in 1975. The goals of
this program were to increase payment and collection of child support. In 1996 the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") 42
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (2000 & Supp 2003) created a new program known as Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") to replace Aid to Families with Dependant
Children ("AFDC"). The number of families on welfare was viewed as a direct conse-
quence of the non-custodial parent's failure to pay child support. Therefore PRWORA
included amendments to the CSP geared toward increasing the effectiveness of child
support collection efforts. Although the changes were the result of welfare reform ef-
forts, assistance is available to anyone who needs help collecting child support. The
CSP requires that each state have a plan for child support collection. The plan must
include:
(1) provisions for automatic wage withholding of child support payments,
(2) expedited procedures for the administrative collection of child support,
(3) procedures to intercept state tax refunds,
(4) procedures to place liens on the real and personal property owned by the
non-custodial parent for overdue support,
(5) involuntary and voluntary procedures to establish paternity,
(6) procedures to require non-custodial parents to post bond for overdue child
support,
(7) that orders are not subject to retroactive modification,
(8) procedures for review of orders every three years upon the request of a
party,
(9) procedures to ensure that persons owing overdue support have a plan to
pay, and
(10) procedures to withhold, suspend, restrict the use of drivers license, profes-
sional andoccupationallicenses, recreational and sporting licenses of those ow-
ing support.
42 U.S.C. § 666 (a).
The state plan must also provide for the establishment of child support guidelines
that "take into consideration all earnings and income of the non-custodial parent." 42
U.S.C. § 667 (a). Adherence to these guidelines must create a rebuttable presumption
that the amount of support awarded is appropriate. Additionally, the plan must provide
that any judge who deviates from the guidelines enter written findings of fact to justify
the deviation. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (b). To ensure that the guidelines result in the appropri-
ate amount of support being awarded, the guidelines must be reviewed every four years.
42 U.S.C. § 667 (a). Failure to pay can result in suspension of drivers licenses and cer-
tain other licenses until and unless the individual works out a payment plan with the
state agency responsible for administering the program. In addition, the individual
could be held in contempt of court or subject to state criminal charges for failure to
support their dependants.
247. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING, INTERMI'ITENT CONFINE-
MENT SANCTIONS STANDARD, 18-3.19.
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the offender to go to work or to a job training program, for instance,
during the day and return to confinement during the evenings and
weekends. Use of intermittent sentencing in this way would greatly
reduce the offender's opportunity to have children, while not imposing
a condition prohibiting fatherhood. It also would allow the offender to
work and provide support for his current children. Hopefully, the fact
that his freedom is restricted in this way would be unpleasant enough
to get the message across to the offender that he must support his
children.
A similar alternative is suggested by the California probation
statutes. Under California law, a probationer can be placed in coun-
ties or cities where road camps, farms, or other public work is availa-
ble instead of in jail.248 The court has the power to order adult
probationers to work. They are paid according to a pay scale fixed by
the public entity. In addition, the court can order the probationer to
support his or her dependants.P'? If the court used both of these op-
tions, it would be easier to ensure that the probationer had a job and
that the children received some level of support as the probationer's
wages could be easily attached for support. The restriction on his lib-
erty would emphasize to the offender that he must support his
children.
Finally, incarceration is an option available to courts when deal-
ing with criminal failure to pay support. Incarceration would serve to
rehabilitate the offender and protect society. A criminal conviction
means that the offenders have violated the law. From a retributive
standpoint, they must pay for their crimes. Incarceration is one they
can pay. Incarceration would get the point across that failing to pay
child support will not be tolerated. In addition, rehabilitation could
occur behind bars.
Oakley and Talty involved offenders with a long history of failure
to pay child support. It is likely that administrative means to collect
support had been tried unsuccessfully. Oakley had faced criminal
charges in the past for failure to pay child support. The problem in
both cases was persistent leading to the conclusion that the defend-
ants were either unable to payor unwilling to pay. In either situation,
a condition limiting their right to have children is not the most effec-
tive means to deal with the problem because the condition will not put
food on the children's table.
248. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1(a) (West 2004). The court has the same power to
require adult probationers to work, as prisoners confined in the county jail. Each
county is required to establish a pay scale for compensation ofthe adult probationers in
that county. [d.
249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.l(d) (West 2004).
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Criminal action should not be taken against someone truly unable
to pay. They should be subject to neither incarceration nor probation.
Instead, other means should be explored to help the individual so that
he will be able to pay child support. Assistance in the form of job
training and placement could be the key to solving the problem. Hope-
fully, for offenders like Oakley and Talty, their ability to pay has been
thoroughly explored by their attorneys prior to making the decision to
plead guilty or no contest to the offense. For those who decide to plead
not guilty, the same issue should be addressed by the court in hear-
ings leading up to the conviction.
On the other hand, those who are unwilling to pay support and
who have demonstrated this by willful persistent violations of court
orders should be dealt with by an appropriate prison sentence. This
type of offender does not deserve the freedom allowed by probation.
He is demonstrating that more forceful means are necessary to make
him understand the gravity of his offense. Time behind bars would
broadcast the message loud and clear that 'You must support your
children.' If having additional children who would be victimized is
truly a concern, incarceration is the only way to ensure that the of-
fender doesn't father additional children. Under current law there is
no right to freedom in procreation decisions while incarcerated.s''?
There are disadvantages to putting the offender in jail. First, if
the offender has a job, he is likely to loose it, especially if he is incar-
cerated for a long term. However, if he had a job he most likely
250. The court in Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F. Supp.2d 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2000), affd,
291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002) concluded that there is
no right to procreate while behind bars using artificial methods. Mr. Gerber, sentenced
to 100 years to life plus eleven years under a three strikes provision, wanted to have a
child with his 41 year old wife. Gerber was not likely to be paroled and was not eligible
for conjugal visits. He requested to provide sperm that would be sent to his wife so that
she could be artificially inseminated. The prison officials refused to grant permission
for this procedure and Gerber filed a 1983 action against them in Federal District
Court. Gerber argued that under Skinner, his right to procreate survived incarceration.
According to Gerber this meant that the right existed during incarceration. Rejecting
this argument, the District Court ruled that Gerber had no right to procreate while in
prison because such a right was inconsistent with his status as a prisoner. Gerber ap-
pealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A three judge panel reversed
the district court, ruling that further information was needed to decide whether the
restriction on Gerber's right to procreate was necessitated by a legitimate penological
interest. The case was reconsidered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. It affirmed
the district court's decision concluding that the right to procreate while in prison is
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. The Supreme Court declined to review
this decision. At this time there is no right to freedom to make procreation decisions
while incarcerated. Consequently, sentencing someone who refuses to pay child support
to incarceration is a means to prevent them from having more children. If the court
concludes that preventing the offender from having children is absolutely necessary to
rehabilitate him and to protect the public, he should be incarcerated rather than put on
probation.
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wouldn't be facing criminal charges for failure to support his children.
His wages could be attached for payment of child support. Another
disadvantage of incarceration is that the child is likely to get nothing
from the offender while he is behind bars. The impact of this disad-
vantage is lessened slightly by the fact that, in many jurisdictions
courts will not suspend a child support obligation during periods of
incarceration. Consequently, the court ordered support will continue
to accumulate throughout the period ofincarceration.251 The offender
is likely to leave jail with substantial arrears accumulated. Payment
of the arrears, should the offender ever be able to pay, would benefit
the child. The offender will be required to pay both current support
and the arrears. Although the amount accrued may be more than the
offender can realistically be expected to pay, he will get a loud and
clear message: support your child or go to jaiJ.252 The final disadvan-
tage is that the presence of a conviction on the offender's record may
make finding a job difficult if not impossible. At the very least, it may
251. Many courts refuse to modify or terminate a parent's obligation to pay child
support during a period of incarceration because courts view incarceration as a volun-
tary reduction in income that does not justify a reduction in child support. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania provides a comprehensive summary of the approaches to this
issue in Yerkes v. Yerkes, 824 A.2d 1169 (Pa, 2003). Yerkes, a non-custodial father, was
convicted of aggravated sexual assault against his daughter, whom he had been ordered
to support. He petitioned the court for a modification or termination of his support
obligation during the ten years he expected to be incarcerated. The court affirmed the
trial court's decision dismissing Yerkes' petition to reduce or terminate his child support
obligation. [d. at 1177. The court discussed the three basic rules other courts had ap-
plied when considering this issue. The first approach referred to as the "no justification
rule" provides that incarceration never justifies a modification of a child support obliga-
tion. The second approach, the "complete justification rule," provides that incarceration
always justifies a modification of the obligation. The final approach, the "one factor
rule," provides that incarceration is a factor the court can consider in determining
whether to modify a child support obligation. In Yerkes the court adopted the "no justifi-
cation rule" because the court concluded that this approach was in the best interest of
the children involved. [d. at 1173. See also, Staffon v. Staffon, 587 S.E.2d 630 (Ga.
2003) (request for child support reduction by parent imprisoned for drug offense de-
nied); Richardson v. Ballard, 681 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (incarceration after
probation revocation not sufficient basis to reduce or terminate child support); Reid v.
Reid, 944 S.W.2d 559 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (court refused to modify support based on
incarceration for molesting a child beneficiary of the support order); In the Matter of
Marriage of Willis, 820 P.2d 858 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (father imprisoned for drug offense
not allowed suspension of child support obligation during period of incarceration); Koch
v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299 (N.D. 1990) (imprisonment for incest offense involving
child support beneficiary not sufficient basis for child support reduction). Courts are
likely to be reluctant to reduce support when the offense leading to incarceration was
failing to pay child support. To reduce the support would have the effect of terminating
the very support obligation the prisoner is incarcerated for not fulfilling.
252. Some courts find this disadvantage a sufficient reason to adopt the "complete
justification rule." This approach provides that incarceration is always a justification
for the modification or termination of a child support obligation. Allowing support to
accrue is viewed as a benefit to no one because it is unlikely the amount will be paid and
interferes with the offender's rehabilitation by forcing him to deal with a substantial
arrearage when he leaves prison. See Yerkes v. Yerkes, 824 A.2d 1169,1172-73 (2003).
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take some time for the offender to find work and pay child support
following his release from incarceration.
Incarceration is not a perfect solution. To avoid the negative mes-
sage sent to the children involved and to the poor by a condition that
limits procreation, if a court concludes that preventing an offender
from having more children is necessary to his rehabilitation and for
the protection of other victims, it should put offenders in jail rather
than on probation. This would send a clear message to them that
their conduct is not acceptable, while not endangering sensitive con-
stitutional rights, sending the wrong message to the children involved
or poor families and placing the system on a slippery slope that could
be heading for involuntary sterilization-the one sure way to stop
dead beat dads from having children.
Incarceration, intermittent confinement, or assignment to public
work are all alternatives to use of a probation condition that limits the
probationer's right to have children. The latter two will yield immedi-
ate results, in terms of support for the child, if work is available. In-
carcerating the offender, while not yielding immediate results, should
yield long-term results. Hopefully, the offender would choose to pay
support in the future rather than risk returning to prison.
IX. CONCLUSION
As acknowledged by the Court many years ago, the right to free-
dom in procreation decisions is a basic liberty.253 Efforts to curtail
this liberty should be carefully considered to ensure that they do not
send the wrong message to society or to those who are the object of
such efforts. People who have a mental disability, who are convicted
criminals, or who are poor are natural targets of such efforts because
of the lack of sympathy they generate in the more aflluent and their
limited means to fight back. Preventing those who have mistreated
children in the past from having more children sounds like a good
idea. No children; no more victims. Allowing such efforts to succeed
however, could have disastrous consequences for society. Just imag-
ine how many children would be born if the criteria were that before
becoming a parent you must have the ability to support the child.
Who determines how much is enough or that a life lived in poverty is
not worth living at all? This is a role no mere mortal, including a
judge, should be allowed to assume.
253. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
